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PATENT CLAIM INTERPRETATION METHODOLOGIES
AND THEIR CLAIM SCOPE PARADIGMS
CHRISTOPHER A. COTROPIA*

ABSTRACT

The optimal scope of patent protection is an issue with which
patent system observers have struggled for decades. Various patent
doctrines have been recognized as tools for creating specific patent
scopes and, as a result, implementing specific patent theories. One
area of patent law that has not been addressed in the discussion on
patent scope and theories is patent claim interpretation. This
omission is particularly noteworthy because of the substantive role
patent claims and the interpretation thereof play in the patent
system, namely the framing of questions of patent infringement and
validity.
This Article will explore the not-yet-discussed relationship between
claim interpretation methodology and patent scope. The discussion
will focus on how changes in interpretation methodology affect patent
scope, an aspect of methodologies that the Article identifies as their
"claim scope paradigm." Introducing the claim scope paradigm
concept is mainly beneficial for two reasons. First, identifying the
claim scope paradigm allows different interpretation methodologies
to be evaluated as to their impact on the substantive function of
patent claims. A claim scope paradigm criterion represents a
significant and worthwhile departure from the current standard of
certainty used by courts and commentators. Second, recognizing
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claim scope paradigms facilitates the use of claim interpretation
methodology as a patent policy lever. Interpretation methodologies
can be highly effective levers, having the ability to inject patent policy
at the most basic level of the patent process.
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INTRODUCTION

The optimal scope of patent protection is an issue with which
patent system observers have struggled for decades. 1 With any
invention, considerations turn to what aspects of the invention
deserve to be protected and are therefore patentable. 2 Questions
also arise regarding what products and processes the inventor
should be able to control with her patent. 3 Both of these areas of
concern fall under the broader question of appropriate patent scope.
Patent scope defines the inventor's power over the markets related
to the patented invention. 4 Different patent theories suggest
different scopes of protection to either create incentives for the
inventor to invent5 or to facilitate the invention's commercialization
and improvement. 6 Various patent doctrines have been recognized
as tools for creating specific patent scopes and, as a result, implementing specific patent theories. 7
One area of patent law unaddressed in the discussion on patent
scope and theories is patent claim interpretation. Patent claims are

1. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575,
1595-99 (2003) (discussing the divergent theories of the optimal patent scope); Robert P.
Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economies of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
839, 839-40 & n.2 (1990) (noting some of the scholarly work on patent scope).
2. See Mark D. Janis, Reforming Patent Validity Litigation: The "Dubious
Preponderance,"19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 923, 937 (2004) ("It is a mistake to suggest changes
to patent validity doctrines without accounting for the interconnections between validity and
other doctrines, such as patent scope, especially in light of the fact that the law of patent
scope has been particularly volatile in the past decade.").
3. See Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent
System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1045 (2003) ("Resolving the infringement question
also requires looking at patent scope.j.
4. See id.; see also Merges & Nelson, supra note 1, at 839-40.
5. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1604-10 (describing the competitive innovation
and the cumulative innovation theories, two ex ante theories of patent law); Mark A. Lemley,
Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 129-31
(2004) (describing the classical ex ante theory of patent law).
6. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON.
265, 266 (1977) (describing the prospect theory of patent law, an ex post patent theory);
Lemley, supra note 5, at 131-35 (explaining the ex post theories of patent law).
7. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1638-68 (cataloging different patent doctrines
that are either currently used, or could potentially be used, to implement particular patent
theories).
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single sentences found at the end of the patent document. 8 They are
statutorily charged with the task of defining the patented
invention. 9 In a vacuum, claim terms are of little use. They must be
interpreted and given meaning so they can be used in a given
context.
The current focus regarding claim interpretation is on which
interpretation method should be used. 10 The question of proper
interpretation methodology has been at the forefront since the
Supreme Court held in Markman u. Westview Instruments, Inc. that
claim interpretation, also known as claim construction, is a matter
exclusively for the courts. 11 Since this decision, the Federal Circuit,
the court with exclusive appellate jurisdiction over patent cases, 12
has consistently spoken on the methodology question. The discussions on proper interpretation methodology developed problematically into two distinct methodologies. 13 Recognizing this fact, the
Federal Circuit recently issued an en bane opinion in Phillips u.
A WH Corp. (Phillips III) choosing one of these methodologies. 14
Heretofore, courts and commentators have not viewed this choice
between methodologies as a question involving patent scope. To the
contrary, claim interpretation methodology has been seen as only
effectuating the public notice function of patent claims. 15 That is,
claims are interpreted only to inform patent observers about the
8. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) (''The specification shall conclude with one or more claims
particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant
regards as his invention.").
9. Id.
10. See R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An
Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1125-26, 1129-36,
1171-72 (2004) (detailing the current trends in claim interpretation methodology).
11. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388-91 (1996).
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2000).
13. See James R. Barney, In Search of"Ordinary Meaning," 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
Soc'y 101, 105-06 (2003) (detailing two distinct claim interpretation methodologies: the
"holistic approach" and the "procedural approach"); Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 10,
at 1133-36 (same).
14. See Phillips v. AWH Corp. (Phillips III), Nos. 03-1269, 03-1286, 2005 WL 1620331,
at *13-15 (Fed. Cir. July 12, 2005) (en bane) (adopting the methodology that relies heavily on
the specification over the methodology that focuses greatly on dictionaries).
15. See John M. Romary & Arie M. Michelsohn, Patent Claim Interpretation After
Markman: How the Federal Circuit Interprets Claims, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1887, 1890-91 (1997)
(noting how the Federal Circuit focuses on the concept of public notice in questions regarding
claim interpretation methodology).
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patented invention, but nothing more. To meet this goal, methodologies that produce certain, reproducible, and definitional results
should be adopted. Claim interpretation methodologies are thus
evaluated under a certainty criterion.
The Federal Circuit's en bane order in Phillips u. AWH Corp.
(Phillips II) makes certainty the only evaluation criterion, asking
which methodology ''better serve[s]" the "public notice function of
patent claims." 16 The Federal Circuit's en bane opinion in Phillips
III continues to recognize certainty as a goal. 17 This narrow focus on
certainty has overlooked claim interpretation methodology's impact
on the other, more important, function of patent claims- substantively defining patent scope. A choice among interpretation methodologies is also a choice among possible patent scopes. Different
approaches to claim interpretation result in different claim definitions, which in turn create different patent scopes because the
defined claim establishes the protection afforded the inventor.
For example, consider the Federal Circuit's recent decision in
Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-Tech Systems, Inc. 18 In Microsoft, MultiTech charged Microsoft with infringing its patents covering the
simultaneous transmission of voice and computer data. 19 The
dispute came down to whether Multi-Tech's patents covered
Microsoft's transmission of voice and data through a packetswitched network, such as the Internet, or if the patent covered
only simultaneous transmission through direct point-to-point
telephone line connections. 20 The Federal Circuit framed this
question as one of patent claim interpretation, asking whether the
patents' claim terms "sending," "transmitting," and "receiving'' were
limited to communication over a direct telephone connection. 21 If so,
Microsoft's technology did not fall within the claims' scope of
exclusivity and therefore did not infringe. 22
16. Phillips v. AWH Corp. (Phillips 11), 376 F.3d 1382, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en bane).
17. See Phillips III, 2005 WL 1620331, at *10, *15. The opinion does, however, include
some recognition of the relationship between interpretation methodology and claim scope. See
id. at *14, *16. The extent of this recognition is discussed in Part IV of this Article.
18. 357 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
19. Id. at 1342-44.
20. Id. at 1344-45.
21. Id. at 1346; see also id. at 1354-55 (Rader, J., dissenting) (framing the dispute the
same way).
22. Id. at 1344-45.
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The court's panel could not agree on a result. The source of their
disagreement was the proper method of interpreting Multi-Tech's
patent claims. The majority interpreted the claims by relying, for
the most part, on the patents' specifications. 23 They focused on
statements in the patents describing the invention as a "personal
communications system [that] includes 'hardware to enable voice,
fax and data communications with a remote site connected through
a standard telephone line .... "'24 As a result of consulting the
specification, the majority limited the claim terms at issue to
communication over a telephone line and found that Microsoft did
not infringe. In contrast, the dissent focused on the ordinary
meaning of the terms "sending," "receiving," and "transmitting," and
concluded that their plain meaning did not limit communication to
a particular network. 25 The dissent, therefore, found that MultiTech's patents covered the disputed products.
Although framed as merely a question of proper interpretation
methodology, the Microsoft decision is also about proper patent
scope. By adopting the specification-centric methodology, the
majority de facto concluded that Multi-Tech should not have
exclusivity beyond the details of the invention described in its
patent. The dissent, in contrast, employed a methodology that
allowed Multi-Tech to enjoy a broader patent scope. The type of
products Multi-Tech could exclude therefore depended on the chosen
methodology. The linkage between methodology and patent scope
exhibited in Microsoft holds true in most cases centered on claim
interpretation.
This Article will explore the relationship between claim interpretation methodology and patent scope. Although the Federal Circuit's
recent opinion in Phillips III has started this discussion, it has yet
to be developed fully. 26 Interpretation methodologies differ in the
informational sources they reference and the degrees of influence
they afford each informational source during interpretation. These
23. I d. at 134 7-49. A patent's specification must contain a description of the invention and
instructions on how to make and use it. 35 U.S. C. § 112 (2000).
24. Microsoft, 357 F.3d at 1348 (quoting and citing portions of the patents at issue).
25. Id. at 1354-55 (Rader, J., dissenting).
26. See Phillips v. AWH Corp. (Phillips Ill), Nos. 03-1269,03-1286,2005 WL 1620331, at
*14, *16 (Fed. Cir. July 12, 2005) (en bane) (mentioning a relationship between the two
methodologies and the resulting claim scope).
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differences usually result in different meanings for the claim terms
at issue. Core patent inquiries then use the defined claim to
determine whether a product or process infringes the patent or
whether the patent is invalid in light of preexisting art. 27 Through
these steps, methodology changes can impact the elements of patent
scope by determining what a patentee can and cannot exclude or
whether a patent is enforceable. As the particulars of claim
interpretation change, so do the resulting patent scope's characteristics.
This Article defines how a methodology affects patent scope as
that methodology's "claim scope paradigm." Encoded in each interpretation method is a unique claim scope paradigm that reflects a
view on the proper scope of protection that an invention should be
afforded. A methodology may favor a narrow patent scope, such as
the majority's approach in Microsoft. On the other hand, a methodology may have a claim scope paradigm that produces broad patent
protection, such as the dissent's methodology in Microsoft. Notably,
the specifics of the methodology employed, and not the claim
language at issue, produce variation in scope between methodologies. In short, the methodology's claim scope paradigm determines
the patent scope.
Many benefits exist in recognizing a claim interpretation methodology's claim scope paradigm. First, identifying the claim scope
paradigm allows different interpretation methodologies to be
evaluated for their impact on the substantive function of patent
claims. Evaluation of claim interpretation methodologies is a
pressing topic, particularly in light of the Federal Circuit's recent en
bane decision in Phillips III that selected between competing
methodologies. As opposed to certainty, claim scope paradigm is
a criterion through which courts and commentators can judge
27. See TI Group Auto. Sys. (N. Am.), Inc. v. VDO N. Am., L.L.C., 375 F.3d 1126, 1139
(Fed. Cir. 2004) ("Our validity analysis is a two-step procedure: 'The first step involves the
proper interpretation of the claims. The second step involves determining whether the
limitations of the claims as properly interpreted are met by the prior art."') (quoting
Beachcombers, Int'l, Inc. v. WildeWood Creative Prods., Inc., 31 F.3d 1154, 1160 (Fed. Cir.
1994)); Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en bane) ("An
infringement analysis involves two steps. First, the court determines the scope and meaning
of the patent claims asserted, and then the properly construed claims are compared to the
allegedly infringing device.") (citations omitted).
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methodologies by their effect on the substantive, patent scopedefining function of patent claims. By identifying and examining the
claim scope paradigm, the substantive implications of a methodology's adoption become transparent. Patent observers can then judge
whether a methodology's claim scope paradigm produces a patent
scope they consider favorable and in line with patent policy. Such a
criterion can prove particularly useful if the Supreme Court or
Congress decides to examine the Federal Circuit's recent decision in

Phillips III.
Second, recognizing claim scope paradigms also facilitates the use
of claim interpretation methodology as a patent policy lever. Patent
policy levers are patent doctrines that can be adjusted to implement
particular patent policies or patent theories. Claim interpretation
methodology has yet to be considered a policy lever, but it possesses
all of the necessary attributes. Courts have wide discretion in
crafting claim interpretation methodology, and methodology directly
affects patent scope by way of its claim scope paradigm. As such,
how claims are interpreted can be a vehicle for implementing patent
policy. In fact, interpretation methodology can be a highly effective
policy lever. Claim interpretation plays a role in all patent decisions,
and when involved in an issue, its involvement occurs at the ground
level by shaping the interpretation of the patent claim that will then
be subject to comparison to an accused device or the prior art. In
almost every case and on almost every issue, interpretation
methodology has the ability to consistently interject patent policy or
theory.
This Article will introduce the concept of a claim interpretation
methodology's "claim scope paradigm" and examine its potential
benefits. The Article will proceed as follows. Part I will explore the
two related rationales for the modern patent claim: the public notice
function and the substantive function of defining literal patent
scope. The patent claim communicates to the world the contours of
the patented invention and, more importantly, actually defines the
scope of patent exclusivity. Part II will introduce the concept of
claim interpretation. The basics of claim interpretation will be
discussed, including both the informational sources usually used
during claim construction and the canons of interpretation that
govern the usage of these sources. Part II will then detail the
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common disagreement among claim interpretation methodologies:
the patent specification's proper use during interpretation. Two
canons govern the specifications: one asking that claims be read in
light of the specification, and the other asking that limitations not
be read into the claims from the specification. The tension between
these two doctrines requires methodologies to choose sides, favoring
one canon over the other. Part II explores the two most recently
utilized methodologies, namely the "specification methodology" and
the ''heavy presumption methodology." These are the two methodologies examined by the Federal Circuit in Phillips III. This Part
looks at the two methodologies' different views on how the specification should influence the resulting claim definition. Whereas the
"specification methodology'' fully examines the specification early in
the interpretation process, the ''heavy presumption methodology''
employs a heavy presumption in favor of the ordinary meaning of
claim terms, and consequently allows the specification to influence
the claim's definition in limited circumstances. Part II will also
discuss the Phillips III decision, in which the Federal Circuit, sitting
en bane, adopted the specification methodology.
Part III discusses the evaluation of claim interpretation methodologies. Part III first discusses the need for evaluation and particularly evaluation criteria. Evaluation criteria allow for rational choice
between different methodologies and, more importantly, introduce
normative reasons-values-:-into the evaluation process. By
selecting particular criteria, evaluators disclose certain goals or
values they would like the interpretation methodology to further.
Part III discusses the certainty criterion currently used in evaluating claim interpretation methodologies. Courts and commentators
have both focused almost solely on certainty as the only standard to
judge methodologies. However, Part III notes some shortcomings of
the certainty criterion, the most significant of which is that it
ignores a methodology's influence on the most important function of
patent claims-substantively defining the patent scope.
Part IV focuses on a new criterion: claim scope paradigm. Part IV
first explains the concept of a methodology's claim scope paradigm.
The two most recent methodologies are then examined to determine
their specific claim scope paradigms. Part IV finds that the specification methodology's claim scope paradigm limits the resulting

60

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:49

claim scope to the full invention disclosed in the specification. In
contrast, the heavy presumption methodology includes a paradigm
that only loosely links the claim scope with the specification's
teachings regarding the invention. Part IV then proceeds to discuss
how methodologies can be evaluated under this criterion. The
evaluator selects the particular patent policy or theory they would
like to further and then judges methodologies based on whether
their claim scope paradigms would further this preferred policy or
theory. Part IV gives examples using the two recent methodologies
and finds that the specification methodology would score well with
an evaluator looking to further the competitive innovation theory of
patent law. The specification methodology's claim scope paradigm
produces a patent scope tied closely to the patentee's actual
inventive activities, giving the patentee far from monopoly power.
In contrast, the heavy presumption methodology does not fare well
under any patent policy or theory because its claim scope paradigm
fails to tune patent scope to the patentee's invention.
Finally, Part IV concludes by discussing the advantages of using
claim scope paradigm as an evaluation criterion. Part IV first
discusses how using the claim scope paradigm gives evaluators the
ability to address the substantive function of patent claims.
Identifying a methodology's claim scope paradigm allows evaluators
to select methodologies that fit their preferred patent theory. Part
IV also notes that the claim scope paradigm exposes the existing
normative backdrop to methodology selection, that is, choosing a
methodology means choosing a patent scope. The second advantage
discussed in Part IV is that methodology is facilitated as a policy
lever. Once the claim scope paradigm is recognized, one can discern
the particular impact that a methodology will have on patent scope.
With this information, courts can use methodology to ensure that
claim definition comports with patent policy, and if patent policy
needs to be changed, courts can select a methodology that effectuates that change.
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I. FuNCTIONS OF PATENT CLAIMS
A modern U.S. patent consists of two basic parts: a specification
and one or more claims. 28 The specification includes textual
descriptions and drawings containing information regarding the
patented invention. 29 This information describes the patented
invention and informs those skilled in the relevant technology how
to implement the invention. 30 A patent ends with one or more patent
claims, 31 which consist of a single sentence describing what the
patentee32 defines as the patented invention. 33 The claim must
"particularly pointO out and distinctly claimO the subject matter
which the applicant regards as his invention."34 Law requires both
the specification and at least one patent claim. 35 Once issued, the
patent, containing the specification and one or more patent claims,
becomes publicly available. 36

28. 35 u.s.c. § 112 (2000).
29. See id. The specification is also referred to as the "written description," because
technically the specification includes the patent claims. See id. (requiring that "[t]he
specification shall conclude with one or more claims"). For purposes of this Article, the term
"specification" will be used to refer to all parts of the patent document other than the claims.
30. Id.; Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1366 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) (describing the contents of a patent's specification).
31. 35 u.s.c. § 112 (2000).
32. The term "patentee" is used to refer to the inventor whose patent is issued. The patent
may be assigned to others, who are then considered the patent owner or patent holder. See
35 u.s.c. § 261 (2000).
33. 35 U.S. C. § 112 (2000); see White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 52 (1886) (''The claim is a
statutory requirement, prescribed for the very purpose of making the patentee define
precisely what his invention is ....").
Claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 6, 725,809 provides a good example of a patent claim. It reads:
"An edible flying retrievable animal toy, comprising: a circular body member having a convex
upper surface and a concave lower surface wherein the body member is formed of rawhide."
The patent is directed towards a flying retrievable animal toy that is also edible. As can be
seen from claim 1, the claim requires the toy to be circular, have a convex upper surface and
concave lower surface, and be made of rawhide. The claim's upper and lower surface
limitations presumably make the claimed flying disc's shape similar to a Frisbee. U.S. Patent
No. 6, 725,809 (flied Feb. 26, 2003) (issued Apr. 27, 2004).
34. 35 u.s.c. § 112 (2000).
35. Id.
36. See id. § 122(b). Patents are available for public viewing and searching through the
USPTO's website. See U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, http://www.uspto.gov. Unless the
applicant selects otherwise, patent applications are published no later than eighteen months
after their filing. 35 U.S. C. § 122(b)(1) (2000).
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The patent claim plays two major roles in patent law. First, the
claim performs a notice function by acting as the vehicle through
which the patentee tells the world what the patentee wishes the
patent to protect. 37 The claim seeks to inform the public of the exact
scope of exclusivity granted by the patent. 38 The claim's notifying
function is effectuated by the claim's predefined and public location
at the end of the universally available issued patent. The patent
claim also performs a substantive function that goes beyond the
claim's public availability. The claim legally defines the patent's
scope of protection. 39 The claim's meaning delineates the subject
matter that only the patentee may practice. 40 Thus, a patent claim
performs both "definitional and public-notice functions." 41 The
following subparts explore these two functions in detail.
A. Public Notice Function

A patent claim seeks to inform the public of the subject matter
over which the patent provides exclusivity. 42 Law requires every
37. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(discussing the public nature of the patent document and the patent claims).
38. See id.; see also Texas Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202 (Fed.
Cir. 2002) (noting how "the public is placed on notice" by patent claims).
39. See Aro Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 339 (1961)
("[T]he claims made in the patent are the sole measure of the grant .... "). The scope of
exclusivity the patent grants to the patentee is also referred to as the "claim scope" or the
"patent scope" of the patent. Claims define the literal patent scope. This scope is
supplemented currently by the doctrine of equivalents. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku
Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 731-32 (2002) (''The scope of a patent is not limited
to its literal terms but instead embraces all equivalents to the claims described." (citing
Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 347 (1854))). For purposes of this Article, the
claim scope and patent scope being referenced is the literal scope of protection because claim
interpretation directly affects only literal scope. Cf. Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc.,
833 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en bane) (articulating the "all elements" rule that prevents a
finding of infringement if every element of a claim or its equivalent is not found in the accused
device).
40. McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 424 (1891) ("'The rights of the plaintiff depend
upon the claim in his patent, according to its proper construction .... "' (quoting Masury v.
Anderson, 16 F. Cas. 1087, 1088 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1873))).
41. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chern. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997).
42. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 373 (1996) ("It has long been
understood that a patent must describe the exact scope of an invention and its manufacture
to 'secure to [the patentee] all to which he is entitled, [and] to apprise the public of what is
still open to them."' (alterations in original) (quoting McClain, 141 U.S. at 424)), aff'd, 517
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patent to have claims, and the claims' preset location at the end of
the specification is statutorily defined. 43 Law also requires the
patentee to "particularly pointD out" the subject matter over which
the patentee wishes to protect in the claim. 44 Once the patent issues,
the patent claim becomes publicly available. 45 All of these aspects
work together so the claim performs its public notice function by
notifying the public of the protected invention.
The claim finds its roots in the need for an instrument to notify
the public about the patent's scope of protection. The patent claim
is relatively new when compared to the existence of the U.S. patent
system. 46 The early patent statutes of 1790 and 1793 did not
explicitly require a claim. 47 Before the modern patent claim, courts
defined the scope of patent rights by discerning the "principle" or
"essence" of the invention from the specification's technical description.48 Any understanding of the full scope of the patentee's
protected invention was taken from the drawings and description in
the patent's specification. This inquiry was recognized as "often a
point of intrinsic dufficulty [sic]."49 Courts and juries encountered
difficultly in discerning exactly what was protected when they
looked only to the specification without any additional guidance. 50
Specifications can be quite long and may contain material that is
irrelevant to defining the patent's scope. Under the specificationonly system, both the patentee and the public were unable to
determine with any certainty the specific contours of the invention
the patent protected. 51
The Patent Act of 1870 introduced specific claiming requirements, indicating that the patentee needed to claim the invention

u.s. 370 (1996).
43. 35 u.s. c. § 112 (2000).
44. Id.
45. See id. § 122(b).
46. William Redin Woodward, Definiteness and Particularity in Patent Claims, 46 MICH.
L. REV. 755, 757 (1948); see also Karl B. Lutz, Evolution of the Claims of the U.S. Patents, 20
J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 134, 134-4 7 (1938) (discussing the history of patent claims).
47. Woodward, supra note 46, at 758; see also Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318
(repealed 1836); Act of Apr. 2, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109, 110 (repealed 1793).
48. See Odiorne v. Winkley, 18 F. Cas. 581, 582 (C.C.D. Mass. 1814) (No. 10,432).
49. Id.
50. See John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the Bar
of Patents, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 273, 309-10 (2002).
51. See id.
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distinctly and with particularity. 52 The 1870Actpromptedpatentees
to draft patent claims, in addition to the information already in the
specification. More specifically, the Act caused patentees to engage
in "peripheral claiming,"53 which involves using claims to '"markO
out the periphery or boundary of the area covered by the claim."'54
The patent claim affords the patentee the opportunity to recite the
specific metes and bounds of the patented invention to the patent's
reader. 55 This use of the claim is meant to reduce the confusion over
what aspects of the invention the patentee seeks to protect. 56
Accordingly, the claim provides public notice of what the patent
protects.
The public notice function of patent claims now stands at the
"forefront of patent law jurisprudence."57 Both the Supreme Court
and the Federal Circuit have emphasized the role the patent claim
plays in informing the public of the subject matter a patent
protects. 58 In fact, the Federal Circuit's first question in the en bane
order in Phillips II emphasized this purpose of patent claims, asking
which claim interpretation methodology better serves "the public

52. Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 26, 16 Stat. 198, 201 (1871).
53. RIDSDALE ELIJS, PATENT CLAIMS§ 4 (1949).
54. Hilton Davis Chern. Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(Nies, J., dissenting) (quoting ELIJS, supra note 53, at § 4), reu'd 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
55. Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 570 (1876) ("This distinct and formal claim is,
therefore, of primary importance, in the effort to ascertain precisely what it is that is patented

....").

56. See, e.g., Giles S. Rich, Extent of Protection and Interpretation of Claims-American
Perspectives, 21 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 497, 501 (1990) ("[T]he function of
claims is to enable everyone to know, without going through a lawsuit, what infringes the
patent and what does not.").
57. Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 15 (2000)
(noting that "[t]he importance of the notice function of the patent claim has always been
appreciated, or at least understood by judges on the Federal Circuit and its predecessor, the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals").
58. See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chern. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1992)
(noting the "public-notice functionD of the statutory claiming requirement"); Univ. of
Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 922 & n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (stating that both the
Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit frequently discuss the public notice function patent
claims serve by telling the public and the Patent and Trademark Office what the patent
protects); PSC Computer Prods., Inc. v. Foxconn lnt'l, Inc., 355 F.3d 1353, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (identifying the claim's key role in informing the public "which products or processes
would infringe the patent and which would not").
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notice function of patent claims." 59 The Phillips III en bane opinion
reiterated the public notice function of patent claims. 60

B. Patent Scope Defining Function
Patent claims perform another function; they actually establish
the scope of exclusivity afforded to an issued patent. 61 That is,
patent claims define the invention the patent will protect. This
definitional function is tied to the claim's public notice function. The
substantive function of a patent claim, however, goes well beyond
the claim simply being locatable and open to public inspection. The
claim tells the public the patent's particular scope of exclusivity by
defining the patent grant's metes and bounds. This is the most
fundamental trait of the modern patent claim. 62
Through the claim's words, the patent claim establishes the
primary area of exclusivity the patentee will enjoy because of the
patent grant. 63 A claim resembles a land description in a deed
because it defines the exact area protected by the legal instrument. 64
59. Phillips v. AWH Corp. (Phillips II), 376 F.3d 1382, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en bane).
60. Phillips v. AWH Corp. (Phillips Ill), Nos. 03-1269,03-1286, 2005 WL 1620331, at *4,
*13-15 (Fed. Cir. July 12, 2005) (en bane).
61. Again, to be complete, the patent claim's literal scope of exclusivity is supplemented
by the doctrine of equivalents. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 21 ("Under this doctrine, a
product or process that does not literally infringe upon the express terms of a patent claim
may nonetheless be found to infringe if there is 'equivalence' between the elements of the
accused product or process and the claimed elements ofthe patented invention." (citing Grauer
Tank & Mfg. Co. u. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950))). The doctrine of
equivalents gives the patentee exclusivity over activities equivalent to the patent claim's
literal scope. See id. Under the doctrine of equivalents, the scope of protection is tied to the
patent claims by the all-elements rule. To find infringement under the doctrine of equivalents,
an equivalent in the accused product for each patent claim element must exist. See id.
62. ''The economic significance of a patent depends on its scope: the broader the scope, the
larger the number of competing products and processes that will infringe the patent." Merges
& Nelson, supra note 1, at 839.
63. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950) (noting that
a claim in a patent provides the metes and bounds of the right that the patent confers on the
patentee to exclude others from making, using, or selling the protected invention); Zenith
Labs., Inc. v. Brystol-Myers Squibb Co., 19 F.3d 1418, 1424 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (noting that the
claim "sets the metes and bounds of the invention entitled to protection of the patent system");
Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
(noting that the claim's preamble can influence the resulting scope of protection that the
entire claim grants).
64. In re Vamco Mach. & Tool, Inc., 752 F.2d 1564, 1577 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (indicating
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A patent grants its owner the right to exclude others from making,
using, offering to sell, or selling the "patented invention." 65 Each
patent claim defines a "patented invention."66 If someone engages in
the patent holder's exclusive activities, they infringe the patent. 67
Infringement is judged by comparing the allegedly infringing
activity to the claims' defined area of exclusivity. 68 ''Victory in an
infringement suit requires a finding that the patent claim 'covers
the alleged infringer's product or process .... "'69
The patent claim is also referenced when determining a patent's
validity. 70 The claim defines the invention, 71 and patent law provides
exclusivity for only those inventions that are useful, novel, and
unobvious. 72 The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
evaluates a patent application by examining each of the applica-

that claims are similar to descriptions oflands in deeds because claims provide the metes and
bounds that define the area protected by the patent).
The description ofland in a deed, like a patent claim, performs both a public notice function
and a substantive function. The deed is meant to convey to all the boundaries of the
landowner's property rights. There is, as with a patent claim, an underlying substantive
aspect to this definition. The deed establishes, at least in part, the area of land exclusively
under the landowner's control. This substantive function of the deed goes well beyond mere
public notification; it establishes the owner's property interests against the world.
65. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000). Section 271(a) also prohibits importing the patented
invention into the United States. See id.
66. Altoona Publix Theatres, Inc. v. Am. Tri-Ergon Corp., 294 U.S. 477, 487 (1935)
("Under the statute it is the claims of the patent which defme the invention."). Each claim
defines a separate and distinct invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000) (noting that each claim
of a patent is "presumed valid independently"); Gould Inc. v. United States, 579 F.2d 571, 576
(Ct. Cl. 1978) ("It is also important to keep in mind that each claim of a patent is a separate
and distinct invention.").
67. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000).
68. See Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 396 (Ct Cl. 1967) (noting that
"[c]ourts can neither broaden nor narrow the claims to give the patentee something different
than what he has set forth").
69. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 374 (1996) (quoting H.
SCHWARTZ, PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 80 (2d ed. 1995)).
70. TI Group Auto. Sys. (N. Am.), Inc. v. VDO N. Am., L.L.C., 375 F.3d 1126, 1139 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) (noting that the "validity analysis is a two-step procedure: 'The first step involves
the proper interpretation of the claims. The second step involves determining whether the
limitations of the claims as properly interpreted are met by the prior art."' (quoting
Beachcombers, lnt'l, Inc. v. WildeWood Creative Prods., Inc., 31 F.3d 1154, 1160 (Fed. Cir.
1994))).
71. Altoona Publix Theatres, 294 U.S. at 487.
72. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (2000) (defining patentable inventions and the conditions on
patentability).
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tion's patent claims. 73 If any particular patent claim defines an
invention that does not meet the patentability requirements, that
claim is rejected, is not issued, and cannot be enforced. 74 A patent
claim's validity can also be evaluated in court after the patent's
issuance. 75 As in proceedings before the USPTO, the court determines whether the claim's defined subject matter meets the patentability requirements. 76 If the claimed subject matter fails any of
the protectability requirements, the court invalidates that patent
claim. 77 In all validity determinations, the claim is the starting point
of the analysis because it substantively defines what the patentee
wishes to protect. 78 Instead of deciding whether someone infringes
this area of protection, validity questions look at the claimed subjec.t
matter and determine whether it is worthy of a limited period of
exclusivity.
The patent claim's scope is often dispositive for most patent
issues. 79 Once the subject matter the patent claim identifies is
defined, infringement and validity questions usually are answered
easily. 8° For questions of infringement, the accused device either
falls within or outside the claim's defined area of exclusivity. 81 For
73. See In re Crish, 393 F.3d 1253, 1256-57 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting that the USPTO's
determination of a patent claim's validity first involves construing the patent claims).
74. See id.; see also 35 U.S. C. § 131 (2000) (granting the issuance of a patent only after a
patent application is examined to determine if the applicant is entitled to a patent under the
law).
75. 35 u.s.c. § 282 (2000).
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir.
2001).
79. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Mayer,
J., concurring) (noting that "to decide what the claims mean is nearly always to decide the
case"), affd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996); Nard, supra note 57, at 3 & nn.6-7 (listing cases that
indicate that the claim meaning controls the outcome in patent cases).
80. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 989.
81. See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 10, at 1117-18 (noting how claim meaning
guides the inquiry in questions of infringement).
Consider the flying, edible, animal toy claim set forth in note 33. The claim required the toy
to be made of "rawhide." If a competitor decided to make a flying, edible, animal toy that was
circular and shaped like a Frisbee, but made out of dried pork skin, a question would arise
as to whether the competitor infringed. The question would center on the meaning of the term
"rawhide" and whether it encompassed dried pork skins. If "rawhide" includes dried pork
skins, the competitor infringes and the patent holder can enjoin the infringer from making
and selling the product. However, if "rawhide" does not include dried pork skins, then the
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validity questions, the subject matter the patentee seeks to protect
with the claim has either been done before or not. 82 The patent
claim, and more importantly its defined area of exclusivity, play a
central role in the patent system. 83 That is why the substantive
function of patent claims or in other words defining the area of
exclusivity is so important. The patent claim's defined area of
protection dictates what the patentee can exclude and properly
protect. 84
The patent claim, which is intimately intertwined with infringement and validity-the two core questions in patent law-sits at the
core of most patent protection theories. 85 All patent theories speak
to the proper scope of patent protection. 86 The breadth of protection
defines the patent's exclusionary power and how it can affect the
technological development in the patent's given industry. 87 The
scope of protection also defines the patent's power relative to what
has already been done, thereby establishing how different an
invention must be from an earlier accomplishment to warrant
patent protection. 88 Both of these effects of patent protection are
addressed by patent theories, which opine about how such
protections should be tailored. 89 Patent theory, and related questions of patent policy, therefore hinge on a patent's scope of
exclusivity. 90 The patent claim defines this scope of exclusivity.

patentee holds no power over the competitor. The claim defines the scope of exclusivity the
patentee enjoys, and its meaning usually dictates the outcome of most infringement questions.
82. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
83. See Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539, 549 (1852) ("The franchise which
the patent grants, consists altogether in the right to exclude every one from making, using,
or vending the thing patented, without the permission of the patentee. This is all that he
obtains by the patent.").
84. See Nard, supra note 57, at 3.
85. Theories of patent protection, also referred to as patent theories, are "explanations for
the role of patents" and statements "as to their optimal division and scope." Burk & Lemley,
supra note 1, at 1595.
86. Id.
87. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 1, at 839-40.
88. See Ted O'Donoghue, A Patentability Requirement for Sequential Innovation, 29 RAND
J. ECON. 654, 657 (1998).
89. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1595-615 (summarizing competing patent
theories).
90. See id. at 1580.
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By defining the patent's exclusionary power, the patent claim
thus performs an important substantive function in patent law. The
claim is utilized to establish the borders of protection, which in turn
are referenced to decide whether a competitor can be excluded or a
patent is worthy of protection. The patent claim's central role in
these decisions places it at the center of substantive patent decisions and patent theories.
II. PATENT CLAIM INTERPRETATION METHODOLOGIES

For a patent claim to perform either of the functions described
above, a patent claim must be given meaning; it must be interpreted.91 Once interpreted, the public is notified fully of the patented
invention. The claim meaning provides observers with a better
understanding of the patent. In addition, claim interpretation
establishes the substantive boundaries of the patent's protection.
Defining claim terms establishes the edges of the exclusivity
provided by the patent.
Courts possess tremendous discretion in how to interpret claims.
Consequently, different claim interpretation methodologies have
emerged. This Part will introduce the basics of claim interpretation
upon which methodologies are based. Both the tools used in interpretation and the canons governing these tools will be discussed.
A general agreement exists about the universe of information
sources one can use when interpreting claims. The difference
between methodologies is usually introduced in the selection of
various canons governing the use of these information sources. The
most common variation among interpretation approaches-the use
of the specification-will be examined.
This Part will conclude by looking at the two claim interpretation
methodologies that the Federal Circuit considered in Phillips III.
The difference between these two methodologies results from
differing views on the specification's role in claim interpretation.
These differences expand to include dissimilarities on the relationship between the specification, claims, and extrinsic definitional
sources, such as dictionaries. Both methodologies are exemplified in
91. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en bane).

70

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:49

the Federal Circuit's panel decision in Phillips u. AWH Corp.
(Phillips 1). 92 The majority and dissent's disagreement over these
methodologies in Phillips I forms the basis of the en bane decision
in Phillips III. 93
A. Claim Interpretation Basics
Claim interpretation, also known as claim construction, involves
defining a claim term or terms to determine the claim's exact
meaning. 94 Once a claim's meaning is determined, the exact location
of the patent's metes and bounds are known and infringement or
validity issues can be determined. 95 Claim interpretation places the
claim in context for the particular patent dispute at issue. 96
Interpreting claim terms is the starting point to answering these
fundamental patent questions. 97 Claim interpretation is, therefore,
the first step in any patent inquiry, 98 and in most patent cases it is
also the stopping point. 99
92. See Phillips v. AWH Corp. (Phillips I), 363 F.3d 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2004), vacated, 376
F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en bane).
93. See Phillips v. AWH Corp. (Phillips Ill), Nos. 03-1269,03-1286,2005 WL 1620331, at
*2-3 (Fed. Cir. July 12, 2005) (en bane) (discussing the Phillips I decision's two approaches to
claim interpretation). The dispute between these two methodologies did not start with the
Phillips I decision. The dispute can be traced at least as far back as Federal Circuit
jurisprudence after the Supreme Court's decision in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
517 U.S. 370 (1996). See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 10, at 1111, 1133-34 (discussing
two distinct methodologies that have emerged since the Supreme Court's decision in
Markman that differ, at least in part, in how they use specification). The two methodologies
have, however, crystallized over the course of the last ten years. Id.
94. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1995), affd, 517
U.S. 370 (1996) (stating that the first step in the infringement analysis is "commonly known
as claim construction or interpretation").
95. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 374 (1996) (''Victory in an
infringement suit requires a finding that the patent claim 'covers the alleged infringer's
product or process,' which in turn necessitates a determination of'what the words in the claim
mean."') (quoting H. SCHWARTZ, PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 80 (2d ed. 1995)); McGinley v.
Franklin Sports, Inc., 262 F.3d 1339, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Amazon.com, Inc. v.
Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (noting that claim
construction is the first step in a validity analysis).
96. Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 10, at 1119.
97. Id. (noting that, while still a matter of debate, "it is clear that claim construction plays
a major-and perhaps the major-role in patent infringement litigation"); Nard, supra note
57, at 4 (noting that claim interpretation "lies at the heart of our patent system").
98. See Cybor Corp. v FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en bane).
99. Markman, 52 F.3d at 993 (Mayer, J., concurring). "Where the parties do not dispute
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Although some basic doctrines exist that govern how claims are
interpreted, courts currently maintain a wide range of discretion
when construing patent claims. No statute indicates the exact
procedure for claim interpretation. 100 Moreover, no recognized
constitutional restraints exist that dictate a particular approach to
construction. 101 Statutory law indicates what must appear in the
patent document and requires the claims to define the invention, 102
but does not expressly instruct courts on how to approach defining
claim terms. This wide room for discretion allows for the development of different claim interpretation methodologies. 103
Any patent claim interpretation methodology consists of two basic
parts. The first entails defining a group of eligible interpretative
sources. 104 The universe of interpretative sources identifies which
materials one may look to when determining a claim's meaning. The
second aspect of any interpretation methodology consists of using a
set of canons of interpretation. 105 These canons govern how the
interpretative sources are used to determine a claim term's
any relevant facts regarding the accused product ... but disagree over possible claim
interpretations, the question of literal infringement collapses into claim construction and is
amenable to summary judgment." Gen. Mills, Inc. v. Hunt-Wesson, Inc., 103 F.3d 978, 983
(Fed. Cir. 1997). Parties commonly stipulate to the outcome of issues of infringement or
validity once a court issues its claim interpretation. See Rousey Pharms., Inc. v. Astrazeneca
UK Ltd., 366 F.3d 1348, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (indicating that the patentee stipulated that
if the district court's construction "were not reversed or modified on appeal, its patents would
be invalid and not infringed"). In fact, a court's claim construction often prompts settlement
in patent cases. Patent Litig. Comm. of the Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass'n, The
Interpretation of Patent Claims, 32 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. Assoc. Q.J. 1, 5 (2004) ("Given the
great impact claim construction may have on the outcome of a case, the court's construction
of the claims of a patent may be case dispositive or drastically affect the prospect of
settlement.").
100. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) (stating that a single patent claim is required, but not
indicating how that claim should be interpreted).
101. But see Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil Law System: The Role of the
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Law, in A MATI'ER OF
INTERPRETATION 3, 9-13, 34-35 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (arguing that the Constitution's
separation of powers requires a specific method of statutory interpretation).
102. See 35 U.S. C. § 112 (2000).
103. See Phillips v. AWH Corp. (Phillips II]), Nos. 03-1269,03-1286,2005 WL 1620331, at
*4 (Fed. Cir. July 12, 2005) (noting that 35 U.S. C. § 112 requires the specification and claims
be related, but does not answer "the extent to which we should resort to and rely on a patent's
specification in seeking to ascertain the proper scope of its claims").
104. See ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL
AGE 216-20 (3d ed. 2003) (detailing the commonly used interpretative sources in patent cases).
105. See id. at 220-22 (describing four major canons of patent claim interpretation).
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meaning. 106 The universe of interpretative sources that courts use
to interpret claims is well defined and fairly uncontroversial. 107 The
canons that govern these interpretative sources, in contrast, form
the foundation for the differences between most approaches.

1. Interpretative Sources
The interpretative sources utilized in claim interpretation fall
into two general categories. The first category includes three sources
identified as "intrinsic evidence." 108 These three sources constitute
intrinsic evidence because they are publicly available and unique to
the patent under construction. 109 In other words, they comprise part
of the patent being interpreted. 110
The claim language is intrinsic evidence. 111 The claim's words
seek to define the patented invention's scope. 112 Because the claim
is what is being interpreted, the language contained therein should
play a role in its own interpretation. 113 The specification accompanying the claim being interpreted is also an intrinsic interpretative source 114 because, by definition, it is contained in the same
public patent as the claims and must describe the claimed invention.115 Thus, the specification is eligible as a source from which one
can discern a claim's meaning. 116 The third and final piece of
intrinsic evidence is the patent's prosecution history. 117 The
prosecution history is a record of all proceedings before the USPTO
regarding the patent. 118 This history is publicly available and
106. See id. at 216.
107. But see John R. Thomas, On Preparatory Texts and Proprietary Technologies: The
Place of Prosecution Histories in Patent Claim Interpretation, 47 UCLA L. REV. 183 (1999)
(arguing that prosecution history should not be referenced during claim construction).
108. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
109. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
110. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582.
111. Id.; see also Bell Commc'ns Research, Inc. v. Vitalink Commc'ns Corp., 55 F.3d 615,
620 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
112. 35 u.s.c. § 112 (2000).
113. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582.
114. Id.; Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397-98 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
115. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000); Autogiro, 384 F.2d at 397-98.
116. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
117. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582-83.
118. Id.
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includes correspondence between the USPTO and the patentee
regarding the patent's examination prior to being issued. 119 The
prosecution history may contain the patentee's representations
regarding the scope of the patent's claims. 120
"Extrinsic evidence" encompasses sources falling outside the
patent's public record. 121 For example, extrinsic evidence includes
expert and inventor testimony, scientific articles, technical treatises,
and dictionaries. 122 These sources may be relevant to claim terms or
the patent's field of technology 123 but they are not specific to the
patent and thus cannot be deemed intrinsic. 124

2. Canons of Interpretation
The canons of interpretation govern how one uses the sources
identified above to define claim terms. 125 Typical canons explain
how an interpretative source is used to determine a claim term's
meaning. For example, the canon of claim differentiation instructs
courts to compare claims in the same patent to ensure that the
meaning of one claim does not render another claim and its
meaning redundant. 126 Claim differentiation identifies an interpretative source-the patent claims-and instructs one how to use it to
arrive at a claim meaning, namely by interpreting two claims to
have different meanings.
Other canons speak to the interrelationship between the different
interpretative sources. Canons will establish a hierarchy among
interpretative sources, indicating which source should be considered
first when construing claims and whether the meaning gleaned from
one source should trump the suggested meaning from another. For
example, one canon instructs the construer to refer to intrinsic
evidence before looking at extrinsic evidence, thereby favoring the
119. See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 32-33 (1966).
120. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582-83.
121. Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1216 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
122. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1584.
123. Id.
124. See id.
125. MERGES ET AL., supra note 104, at 216.
126. See Ecolab, Inc. v. Paraclipse, Inc., 285 F.3d 1362, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2002). This canon
is usually employed as a presumption that "each claim in a patent is presumptively different
in scope." Intermatic Inc. v. Lamson & Sessions Co., 273 F.3d 1355, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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former over the latter. 127 The canon also provides that extrinsic
evidence can only be used to define claim terms when a claim's
meaning remains ambiguous after consulting all three forms of
intrinsic evidence. 128 This interpretation canon establishes a
definite hierarchy, placing intrinsic evidence before extrinsic
evidence in sequence of reference and expressly limiting when
extrinsic evidence can influence the ultimate claim definition. 129
Some canons have exceptions and methodologies may vary based
on their observance or nonobservance of these exceptions. 130

B. Common Variation Among Methodologies: The Degree of Influence of the Specification
One of the most common variations between methodologies is
how they use the specification when interpreting claim language.
Specifically, this variation involves the degree of influence that
information in the specification can have on the resulting interpretation. Some methodologies ensure that the specification is referenced, and its teachings used to influence, a claim term's definition
in every interpretation. In other methodologies, the specification is
referred to in limited circumstances and, in turn, its teachings will
rarely inform the resulting construction. This variation stems from
two often cited and conflicting interpretation canons: the canon to
read the claims in light of the specification, and the canon prohibiting reading limitations from the specification into the claims. These
two canons, the tension between them, and the resulting common
127. See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583-84.
128. Id.; see also Hormone Research Found., Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 904 F.2d 1558, 1562
(Fed. Cir. 1990).
129. See Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1216 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("In
construing the claims we look to the language of the claims, the specification, and the
prosecution history. Extrinsic evidence may also be considered, if needed to assist in
determining the meaning or scope of technical terms in the claims.") (citations omitted).
130. For example, some methodologies, while abiding by the canon favoring intrinsic
evidence, will still refer to dictionaries, an extrinsic source, before referencing intrinsic
evidence. See Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202-03 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(discussing how dictionaries, encyclopedias, and treatises should be consulted initially when
interpreting claims, even though a prohibition exists against referring to extrinsic evidence
so early in the interpretation process); Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d
1298, 1308-09 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (explaining that courts can examine extrinsic evidence, even
when the patent is unambiguous, to understand the underlying technology).
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variation among methodologies will be explored below. However,
before this discussion, a brief understanding of the specification's
contents is necessary.

1. Patent Specification
A patent specification includes three basic elements: a written
description, an enabling description, and the best mode. 131 All
three elements focus on the invention and, in particular, the
invention recited in the patent claims. 132 The invention that the
specification must describe and enable is the invention that the
patent claims define. 133 Through the written description requirement, the specification must include a reasonably detailed textual
description of the claimed invention. 134 The enablement requirement
asks the inventor to set forth a working embodiment of the claimed
invention in the specification. 135
The written description element requires the patentee to describe
the invention in sufficient detail to convey with reasonable clarity
to a person skilled in the art that the patentee was in possession of
the invention on the patent's filing date. 136 The specification must
131. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). This Article's discussion regarding the specification
requirements will focus on only the written description and enablement requirements.
132. See Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen·Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 968 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (noting
that the patent specification must "describe the claimed invention so that one skilled in the
art can recognize what is clainled").
133. See Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Enzo
Biochem, 323 F.3d at 968; In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Hyatt, 708
F.2d 712, 714 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("[T]he enabling disclosure of the specification [must] be
commensurate in scope with the claim under consideration.").
134. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000); Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 156 F.3d 1154, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
Currently, much debate exists about whether there is a written description requirement
distinct from the enablement requirement. See Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 375
F.3d 1303, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Newman, J., dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing
en bane); see also Mark D. Janis, On Courts Herding Cats: Contending with the "Written
Description" Requirement (and Other Unruly Patent Disclosure Doctrines), 2 WASH. U. J.L.
& POL'y 55, 61·69 (2000) (arguing that "the distinction between the written description and
enablement requirements is artificial").
135. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000); Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d
1354, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
136. 35 U.S. C.§ 112 (2000); Moba, B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 132021 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1562-63 (Fed. Cir. 1991);
Ralston Purina Co. v. Far-Mar-Co, 772 F.2d 1570, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Kaslow, 707
F.2d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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include enough information, through text and/or drawings, to
show a skilled artisan that the patentee knew of the patented
invention when the patent's application was filed with the
USPT0. 137 Therefore, the specification must describe the universe
of inventions the patentee may decide to claim. 138 The description
requirement prevents the patentee from patenting something the
patentee has not demonstrated to the public as having been
invented by the patent's filing date. 139
The enablement element, in contrast, requires the specification
to disclose "the manner and process of making and using [the
invention], in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable
any person skilled in the art to which [the invention] pertains,
or with which [the invention] is most nearly connected, to make
and use the same ...." 140 The specification must provide the public
with enough information to enable the practice of the claimed
invention. 141 Although the specification need not disclose every
possible embodiment of the claimed invention, it must provide
enough detail to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to
practice the full breadth of the patent's claims. 142 The teachings can
require some experimentation on the skilled artisan's part, as long
as "undue experimentation" is not required. 143

137. See Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1561; see also Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565,
1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (noting that the written description requirement may be satisfied with
"words, structures, figures, diagrams, formulas, etc.").
138. Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1560-62. The written description requirement was meant
initially to ensure that the specification defined the patented invention. Evans v. Eaton, 20
U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356, 430-33 (1822). Patent claims have since taken over this task. See supra
notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
139. See Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d 535, 551 (3d Cir. 1981) (noting that the
requirement "guards against the inventor's overreaching" by having the specification describe
the full breadth of her "original creation" at the time of filing); see also In re Gosteli, 872 F.2d
1008, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("Although [the patentee] does not have to describe exactly the
subject matter claimed, the description must clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art
to recognize that [the patentee] invented what is claimed.") (citation omitted).
140. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000}. The specification must also include the best mode of practicing
the patented invention the inventor contemplated at the patent's filing. I d.; Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Barr Labs., Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2001}.
141. Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 946 F.2d 1528, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
142. See id.; AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2003); In re Wright,
999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
143. Wright, 999 F.2d at 1561; In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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The enablement requirement, like the written description
requirement, forces the patentee to provide details about the
invention the patentee wishes to claim. To be enabling, the specification must include technical information, and possibly drawings,
showing how a skilled artisan can actually implement the claimed
invention. 144 The specification may include a list of materials used
to make the invention, instructions on how to operate the invention,
or details on the environments in which the invention should
work. The specification usually includes specific working examples
of the invention termed "embodiments" of the invention. 145 The
enablement requirement creates a specification that teaches its
intended audience-those skilled in the relevant art-how to
actually practice the claimed invention.
Because of these two requirements, a patent's specification is
required to contain information about the patentee's invention.
The specification must describe the invention, pursuant to the
written description requirement, and enable its use, pursuant to
the enablement requirement. These requirements ensure that the
specification is rich with invention-specific information, containing
a textual description of the patentee's invention and enough
technical information to enable the use of the patentee's invention.
Notably, a specification's teachings do not end with the specification's text and drawings. The specification is written to a
particular audience, namely a person having ordinary skill in the
art. 146 This individual brings knowledge and skill to bear on the
specification's teachings 147 and thus a description of one way to
implement the invention may disclose a multitude of variations to
a skilled artisan. 148 For example, the specification need not teach
144. CFMT, Inc. v. Yieldup Int'l Corp., 349 F.3d 1333, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
145. Although most patents include working examples to enable the patented invention,
such examples are not explicitly required. See In re Borkowski, 422 F.2d 904, 908 (C. C.P.A.
1970).
146. See Kevin S. Rhoades, The Section 112 "Description Requirement"-A Misbegotten
Provision Confirmed, 74 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'¥ 869, 893-94 (1992) (noting that
those skilled in the art are "the specification's audience").
147. See Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(noting that "[a] patent need not teach, and preferably omits, what is well known in the art");
Scott R. Boalick, Patent Quality and the Dedication Rule, 11 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 215, 228-29
(2004).
148. See In re Howarth, 654 F.2d 103, 105 (C. C.P.A. 1981) ("An inventor need not, however,
explain every detail since he is speaking to those skilled in the art.").
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how to make or use something as well-known as a bolt for fastening
two items together, but the specification also need not teach those
substitutes for a bolt that are well known in the art, such as a nail
or screw. 149 The extent of the specification's teachings go beyond its
literal contents, expanded by the knowledge and skill of the specification's intended audience, a person with ordinary skill in the relevant
art.Iso
Figure 1, below, depicts the specification's teachings. Notably, the
''literal patent specification," that is, what the specification exactly
says and shows, is supplemented with the skill in the art as of the
patent's filing date. 151 This additional knowledge expands the
specification's teachings about the invention, creating what will be
termed the "constructive patent specification." This constructive
specification embodies the full extent of the specification's teachings
about the invention and is labeled the "disclosed invention."

149. The disclosure requirements
permitO resort to material outside of the specification in order to satisfy the
enablement portion of the statute because it makes no sense to encumber the
specification of a patent with all the knowledge of the past concerning how to
make and use the claimed invention. One skilled in the art knows how to make
and use a bolt, a wheel, a gear, a transistor, or a known chemical starting
material. The specification would be of enormous and unnecessary length if one
had to literally reinvent and describe the wheel.
Atmel Corp. v. Info. Storage Devices, Inc. 198 F.3d 1374, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
150.
That is not to say that the specification itself must necessarily describe how to
make and use every possible variant of the claimed invention, for the artisan's
knowledge of the prior art and routine experimentation can often fill gaps,
interpolate between embodiments, and perhaps even extrapolate beyond the
disclosed embodiments, depending upon the predictability of the art.
AK Steel Corp. v. Sallac, 344 F.3d 1234-44 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also In re Gay, 309 F.2d 769,
774 (C. C.P.A. 1962) (noting the appreciation by one skilled in the art of aspects in the not
explicitly disclosed specification).
151. See In re Wertheim, 646 F.2d 527, 530 (C. C.P.A. 1981) (noting that the specification
teachings are frozen as of the patent's filing date). Although not visually depicted in Figure
1, the specification's literal teachings are also supplemented with experimentation by the
skilled artisan that is not undue. See AK Steel, 344 F.3d at 1244.
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2. Use of the Specification in Claim Interpretation
The specification is considered intrinsic evidence and a wellrecognized information source for claim interpretation. However,
the specification's exact usage in the construction of patent claims
is not as clear. In fact, the specification's different uses in claim
construction can conflict with one another, forcing a methodology to
choose one use over the other.
Two often cited interpretation canons illustrate the friction
surrounding the specification's use in construing claims. 152 One
canon notes that claim language is "read in light of the specification" during construction. 153 A claim's meaning should be informed
by the information contained in the accompanying specification. The
152. Others have noted the tension between these two canons. See Romary & Michelsohn,
supra note 15, at 1897-926; Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 10, at 1133.

153. Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead Indus., Inc., 810 F.2d 1113, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
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rationale behind this canon finds its roots in the statutory linkage
between the specification's contents and the claimed invention. 154
The patent is an "integrated document," with the specification
further describing the subject matter that the claims recite. 155 As
such, the specification describes the claimed invention and can place
the claimed invention in context. 156 Doing so helps one understand
how a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art would interpret
the claims. 157 Therefore, consulting the specification during claim
interpretation is both beneficial and logical.
In contrast, another canon indicates that limitations from the
specification should not be read into the claims. 158 A claim term's
meaning should not be altered or changed by the specification's
statements. This canon is based on the view that if the specification
dictates the definition of the patent's scope of exclusivity, the patent
claims no longer play their statutory role in patent law. The patent
claims, not the specification, are charged with the task of "particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which
the applicant regards as his invention." 159 If limitations from the
specification are allowed to control the claim language's meaning,
the claim's statutorily charged function is frustrated. For these
reasons, this canon instructs against changing a claim's meaning
based on the specification's teachings.
These two canons can ~oexist. A claim term's meaning can be
informed, but not improperly limited, by the specification. Combining the canons establishes the patent claim as the ultimate informer
of a claim's meaning, while recognizing that the claim does not exist
in a vacuum in the patent document; other information about the
invention exists in the specification. 16° Courts have attempted to
flush out the relationship between the canons by explaining the
154. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
155. Astrazeneca AB v. Mutual Pharm. Co., 384 F.3d 1333, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
156. On·Line Techs., Inc. v. Bodenseewerk Perkin·Elmer GMBH, 386 F.3d 1133, 1138 (Fed.
Cir. 2004).
157. United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 49 (1966); Astrazeneca, 384 F.3d at 1337 (Fed.
Cir. 2004); Vanderlande Indus. Nederland BV v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 366 F.3d 1311, 1318
(Fed. Cir. 2004).
158. Intervet Am., Inc. v. Kee-Vet Labs., Inc., 887 F.2d 1050, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
159. 35 u.s.c. § 112 (2000).
160. See Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa' per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1248 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (noting that both canons share similar underlying principles); Wagner & Petherbridge,
supra note 10, at 1133.
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particular instances where specification information can be used.
For example, if the patentee defines a claim term expressly in the
specification, that definition can be used when interpreting the
claims without violating the canon regarding improperly reading in
limitations from the specification. 161
As the Federal Circuit, academics, and practitioners recognize,
however, a real tension exists in practice between these two
canons. 162 The exact point at which referencing the specification
during interpretation changes from properly "reading the claims in
light of specification" to improperly "reading limitation from the
specification into the claims" is impossible to identify with any
specificity. 163 A "fine line" exists that divides the two canons/64 and
often that line becomes blurred and undefinable. How does one
allow the specification to inform the claim interpretation process
without placing any limits on claim terms? Distinguishing between
"reading in light of' an informational source and "reading in
limitation from" that same source is difficult. 165
Because of the tension between these two canons, courts tend to
adopt claim interpretation methodologies that lean towards one
canon or the other. A given methodology will either allow the
specification to play a significant role during claim construction or
will have the specification play little or no role at all. The specification's influence depends on whether the court wants to ensure that
the claims are read in the context of the specification or wants to
ensure that limitations are not read in from the specification.
Depending on which canon a court attempts to observe in its
interpretative approach, the specification may have a large or small
influence on the resulting definition. This is depicted graphically on
a spectrum in Figure 2 below. The two canons are at each end of the
spectrum and the specification's influence on the resulting claim
161. See Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram Corp., 274 F.3d 1336, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
162. See Comark Commc'ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1186-87 (Fed. Cir. 1998);
Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 10, at 1133.
163. See 1 DONALDS. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS§ 3.02[1)[g)[ii][B) & n.83 (97th release
2005) (''The line between interpreting claim language in light of the specification and reading
a limitation from the specification into the claim is a fine one.").
164. See Comark Commc'ns, 156 F.3d at 1186-87.
165. AI; Wagner and Petherbridge put it, "at what point does an appropriately contextual
analysis spill over into impermissible importation of meaning into the claims?'' Wagner &
Petherbridge, supra note 10, at 1133.
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definition decreases as a court moves from left to right, that is, away
from the first canon and towards the second.

"Read
in Light of'

"Not Read
in Limitations from"

Specification's Influence Decreasing
Figure 2
Although no current claim interpretation methodology sits at
either end of the spectrum, methodologies do occupy areas in
between. To provide further examples of ·how using different
canons results in different interpretation methodologies, the two
most utilized methodologies, which the Federal Circuit examined en
bane in Phillips III, 166 will now be explored.

C. Majority and Dissent in the Phillips v. AWH Corporation Panel
Decision: An Example of Two Different Claim Interpretation
Methodologies
The majority's and dissent's opinions in the Federal Circuit's
panel opinion in Phillips I provide a good example of methodologies
that use the specification in different ways. 167 The majority refers
to the whole specification early in the claim construction process,
using all of the information contained therein to inform its definition of the claim term at issue. The majority's approach favors the
canon of reading the claims in light of the specification. This
methodology sits towards the left, that is, the "read in light of' end
of the spectrum in Figure 2. In contrast, the dissent relies little on
the specification's teachings, employing a heavy presumption in
166. Phillips v. AWH Corp. (Phillips Ill), Nos. 03-1269, 03-1286, 2005 WL 1620331, at *2-3
(Fed. Cir. July 12, 2005) (en bane).
167. The fact that the majority and dissent in Phillips /provide such good examples of two
distinct interpretation methodologies most likely played a significant role in the Federal
Circuit's choice to take the Phillips case en bane.
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favor of the ordinary meaning of the patent's claim language, as
derived preferably from a dictionary, when construing the claim
language. The dissent therefore sits closer to the right, that is, the
"not read limitation in from" end of the spectrum in Figure 2. Both
of the methodologies employed in Phillips I and analyzed in Phillips
III will be described in more detail below.

1. The Majority's Methodology's Full and Early Use of the
Specification
The Federal Circuit's majority panel decision in Phillips I
provides a good example of a claim interpretation approach that
uses the specification's teachings fully and early in the process. 168
The patent at issue in Phillips I concerned fire, sound, and impact
resistant modular wall panels. 169 These modular panels are used to
construct detention facilities, such as jails, vaults, or safety
barriers. 170 As the patent claim's preamble details, the claimed
"[b]uilding modules [are] adapted to fit together for construction
of fire, sound and impact resistant security barriers and rooms
for use in securing records and persons ... .'' 171 Edward Phillips, the
named inventor and owner of the patent, sued AWH Corporation
for infringement of his patent on vandalism-resistant building
modules. 172

168. 363 F.3d 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2004), vacated, 376 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en bane). This
full and early use of the specification can be considered part, but not all, of the "holistic
approach" identified by other commentators. See Barney, supra note 13, at 105-06 (identifying
the holistic approach to claim construction); Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 10, at 113336 (same). In the interest of avoiding unnecessary confusion, this Article does not use the term
"holistic approach" to identify the methodology currently under discussion.
169. Phillips I, 363 F.3d at 1209 (noting that the patent at issue was U.S. Patent No.
4,677,798) (filed Apr. 14, 1986) (issued July 7, 1987)).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1209-10 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 4,677,798 (filed Apr. 14, 1986) (issued July 7,
1987)). Claim preambles do not always limit a claim's scope. See C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys.,
Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1998). However, preambles can provide a better
understanding of the invention being claimed. See Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am.
Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("A preamble may provide context for claim
construction ....").
172. Phillips I, 363 F.3d at 1210.
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On appeal, Mr. Phillips and AWH Corporation disputed the
meaning of the claim term ''baffles." 173 The claims at issue use the
term ''baffles" in their detailing of the "internal steel baffles extending inwardly from the steel shell walls" of the claimed modular
building panels. 174 The claimed ''baffles" reside inside the invention's
steel shell that is comprised of two outer steel plate panel sections
that form the building panels. 175 Mr. Phillips asserted that ''baffles"
should be given "its ordinary and customary meaning." 176 Mr.
Phillips argued that ''baffles" should mean something "obstructing,
impeding, or checking the flow of something." 177 Mr. Phillips next
asserted that the ''heavy presumption" in favor of this ordinary
meaning was "not clearly and unequivocally rebutted," 178 and
therefore, additional limitations to the term ''baffles" should not be
read in from the patent's specification. 179
AWH asked the Federal Circuit to construe the term ''baffles" to
reflect the teachings in the patent's specification. 180 AWH asserted
that the district court "properly looked to the specification to
determine the scope of the claimed invention." 181 The specification,
A WH argued, emphasized "the key innovative feature of the invention," namely, the ''baffle configuration, including both the
angled orientation and the interlocking pattern limitations" of the
173. Id. at 1210-11.
174. Id. at 1209-10 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 4,677,798 (filed Apr. 14, 1986) (issued July 7,
1987)) (emphasis added). Mr. Phillips asserted claims 1, 21, 22, 24, 25, and 26 of his patent
against AWH, all of which included the ''baffles" element. Id. at 1210.
175. Id. at 1209-10.
176. Id. at 1211.
177. Id. at 1210. Interestingly, both Mr. Phillips and AWH stipulated to this ordinary
meaning before the district court. Id. The district court, however, found the claim language
to be drafted in means-plus-function format and, therefore, governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112
(2000). Id. The district court's claim interpretation limited the meaning of baffles to the
structures disclosed in the specification and their equivalents, which required the baffles to
"extend inward from the shell walls at oblique or acute angles" and "form an intermediate,
interlocking barrier in the interior of the wall module." Id. Mr. Phillips conceded
noninfringement under this construction and, thus, appealed the construction. Id. at 1210-11.
178. Id. at 1211.
179. Id. These additional limitations, Mr. Phillips contested, were that the baffles "must
be positioned at an acute or obtuse angle to wall faces, and that baffles must form an
intermediate, interlocking barrier." Id.
180. Id. at 1211-12. AWH supported the district court's opinion that, while finding the
claim language to be drafted in means-plus-function language, included limitations discerned
from the specification's teachings. Id.
181. Id. at 1211.
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claimed baffles inside the modular panel's steel shell. 182 Therefore,
the claims' scope should be construed to include baffles with angle
orientations and interlocking patterns to facilitate the building
module's impact-resistant characteristics. 183
The majority in Phillips I proceeded to construe the term ''baffles"
by fully referring to the specification early in the interpretation
process. The majority agreed with AWH, finding the specification
particularly enlightening about the meaning of the claim term
''baffles." 184 The court looked to the specification to determine the
term's meaning "in the context of the entirety of [Mr. Phillips']
invention." 185 The court found the specification "rife with references"
to the claimed building modules' impact-resistant properties. 186 In
particular, the court focused on the specification's descriptions of
the baffles as being "disposed at such angles that bullets which
might penetrate outer steel panels [would be] deflected." 187 The
baffles' angular position is shown further in the patent's drawings,
depicting the baffles "disposed at angles which tend to deflect the
bullets." 188 The court also noted that the patent's specification
does not depict or describe the baffles at a ninety-degree angle,
which cannot deflect projectiles directed at the building module. 189
The majority concluded that the term ''baffles" used in the asserted
claim must include baffles angled at degrees other than ninety
degrees. 190 As the court articulated, "[i]t is impossible to derive
anything else from the specification." 191
182. Id. at 1212.
183. Id. at 1211-12.
184. Id. at 1212.
185. Id. at 1213 (quoting Comark Commc'ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1187 (Fed.
Cir. 1998)).
186. Id. The court noted that "[i]n the section marked 'Disclosure of the Invention,' the
patentee states that the baflles are 'disposed at such angles that bullets which might
penetrate the outer steel panels are deflected.m Id. (quoting U.S. Patent No. 4,677,798 (flied
Apr. 14, 1986) (issued July 7, 1987)).
187. Id. (quoting U.S. Patent No. 4,677,798 (filed Apr. 14, 1986) (issued July 7, 1987)).
188. Id. (quoting U.S. Patent No. 4,677, 798 (filed Apr. 14, 1986) (issued July 7, 1987)). In
particular, the court pointed to Figures 6 and 12 of the patent, which are described as showing
the angular nature of the baflles that deflects bullets that can penetrate the steel shell of the
invented building panels. Id.
189. Id. at 1213-14.
190. Id. at 1214.
191. Id. The majority noted that the patentee stated, at the end of the specification, that
the '"invention has advanced the art by providing modular buildings and modules of high
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The court concluded its claim interpretation analysis by summarizing the methodology it employed:
It is true that claims with the non-restrictive term "baffles" were
allowed. However, the patent specification is intended to support
and inform the claims, and here it makes it unmistakably clear
that the invention involves baffles angled at other than go·. It is
in the interests of a sound patent system and inventors, as well
as the public, to hold inventors to their disclosures. The trial
judge correctly perceived this need ... and interpreted the claims
in accordance with the specification. 192
The majority in Phillips I noted the claim term's ordinary
meaning at the beginning of its analysis, but immediately considered it in light of the other intrinsic evidence available, particularly
the specification. 193 The court attempted to follow the interpretation
canon requiring patent claims to be read in the context of all of
the specification's teachings. The court did not favor a claim term's
ordinary meaning over other intrinsic evidence or employ any
presumption for one type of interpretative source over another. 194
The specification, and its meaning to those skilled in the art, was
investigated with great detail to determine how the claim term at
issue fit within the described invention's scope.
The majority did, however, try to limit the specification's influence on the claim's definition. Only information about the "invention" in the specification was used to construe the claim language. 195
Although the full specification was examined early in the process,
only those parts relevant to the invention were used. In trying to
narrow its use of the specification, the majority's methodology gave
some credence, albeit very little, to the interpretation canon against
reading in limitations from the specification.
strength [and] bullet resistance,' adding that '(u]niquely the advantages of steel shell modules
are combined with thermal and acoustical isolation of two spaced walls and protection against
bullet penetration of the walls."' ld. at 1213 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 4,677, 798 (filed Apr. 14,
1986) (issued July 7, 1987)) (alterations in original).
192. Id. at 1214.
193. Id. at 1212-13.
194. ld. at 1212-14. A dictionary was used to determine whether the term ''baffles" did not
recite any structure and, therefore, was means-plus-function language. Id. at 1212. A
dictionary did not, however, provide the meaning of the term ''baffles" that the majority
adopted.
195. Id. at 1212-14.
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The methodology's full and early use of the specification clearly
leans toward using more rather than less of the specification when
interpreting claims. The majority's approach allows the full extent
of the specification's teachings to have a significant influence on the
resulting claim interpretation. This places the methodology near the
left end of the spectrum in Figure 2. From this point forward, this
Article will refer to this methodology as the "specification methodology."196

2. The Dissent's Methodology's Heavy Presumption in Favor of
Dictionaries
The dissent's claim analysis in Phillips I exemplifies a methodology that does not allow the specification to influence greatly the
resulting interpretation. Instead, the ordinary meaning ofthe claim
term at issue is favored by utilizing a heavy presumption toward the
term's dictionary definition. 197 The dissent implemented this
methodology by first identifying the disputed claim term's ordinary
meaning. 198 The ordinary meaning was taken from a dictionary, in
this case the 2002 edition of Webster's Third New International
Dictionary. 199 The dissent then looked for evidence that would
overcome the heavy presumption favoring this ordinary meaning
and that would warrant the inclusion of the angle orientation limitation in its claim interpretation of ''baffies," as AWH suggested. 200
The dissent looked to the specification to discern whether "the
patentee, acting as his own lexicographer, gave a special meaning
to the term baffies."201 The dissent found nothing to indicate that the
patentee affirmatively redefined the term ''baffies" to be limited to

196. The methodology is given this name to emphasize the specification-centric approach.
197. The heavy presumption in favor of ordinary meaning can be considered part, but not
all, of the "procedural approach" identified by other commentators. See Barney, supra note 13,
at 103-06 (identifying the procedural approach to claim construction); Wagner & Petherbridge,
supra note 10, at 1133-36 (same). In the interest of avoiding unnecessary confusion, this
Article does not use the term "procedural approach" to identify the methodology currently
under discussion.
198. Phillips I, 363 F.3d at 1216-17 (Dyk, J., dissenting in part).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1217-18 (Dyk, J., dissenting in part) (finding no support for adding further
structural limitations to the ordinary meaning of "baffies").
201. Id. at 1217 (Dyk, J., dissenting in part).
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baffles oriented at angles other than ninety degrees. 202 In addition,
the dissent found no disclaimer as to any part of the ordinary
meaning in the specification or the prosecution history. 203 With this,
the dissent saw nothing that suggested a deviation from the
"general purpose dictionary definition" of the term ''baffles" and,
therefore, adopted this ordinary meaning as the correct claim
construction. 204 The claims simply require baffles, regardless of how
the baffles are oriented between the steel shells of the claimed
modular panels. 205
The dissent addressed the parts of the specification that the
majority relied upon in reaching its construction. 206 The dissent
viewed the majority's approach as improperly limiting the claim
language to the only disclosed embodiment in the specification. 207
Although the only embodiment described baffles without a ninetydegree orientation, "no such language clearly limit[s] the claims to
[this] specific structure."208 The dissent also disputed the majority's
reading of the invention's purpose. 209 The specification also identified the invention as having several objectives beyond impact
resistance, such as fire and sound suppression. 210 The term ''baffles,"
therefore, could not be limited to fulfilling only the impact resistance objective. 211 Lacking clear disclaimers on any part of the
ordinary meaning, the dissent concluded that the specification does
not limit the dictionary definition of ''baffles."212
The dissent summarized the claim interpretation methodology as
follows: "Since there is no argument here that one of skill in the art
would ascribe a specialized meaning to the term baffles, and there
has been no disclaimer in the specification or prosecution history,
202. Id. at 1217-18 (Dyk, J., dissenting in part).
203. Id. at 1218 (Dyk, J., dissenting in part).
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1217-18 (Dyk, J., dissenting in part) (refuting the grounds upon which the
majority based its interpretation).
207. Id. at 1217 (Dyk, J., dissenting in part) (citing Federal Circuit case law counseling
against restricting claims to covering the one disclosed embodiment in the specification).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 1217-18 (Dyk, J., dissenting in part).
211. Id. (noting that the specification discusses the additional objectives of ''high load
bearing strength" and "thermal and acoustical isolation of two spaced walls") (quoting U.S.
Patent No. 4,677,798 (filed Apr. 14, 1986) (issued July 7, 1987)).
212. Id. at 1218 (Dyk, J., dissenting in part).
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the general purpose dictionary definition, 'something for deflecting,
checking, or otherwise regulating flow,' applies." 213
The dissent's analysis demonstrates a methodology that favors
the canon against reading limitations from the specification into the
claim. 214 The dissent's approach implements this canon by placing
the claim language and its ordinary meaning well above any of the
specification's teachings. It insulates the claim terms from the
specification by using a heavy presumption in favor of an information source outside of the patent-a dictionary.
The dissent's approach still refers to the specification, presumably
in an attempt to follow the canon requiring the claims to be read
in light of the specification. The dissent's methodology, however,
takes a restricted view of the specification and its role in claim
construction. A dictionary and not the specification is consulted first
to determine the claim term's ordinary meaning. 215 The dissent's
methodology looks at the specification, but only to see if the heavy
presumption is rebutted. The specification is examined to see if the
patentee acted as her own lexicographer. 216 The heavy presumption
could have been overcome if the patentee defined the claim term
clearly in the specification. 217 The heavy presumption could also be
overcome if a clear disclaimer of all or part of a claim term's
ordinary meaning exists. 218 As the dissent's analysis demonstrates, the specification must manifest an express, affirmative
disclaimer. 219

213. ld. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 162 (2002)) (citations
omitted).
214. In fact, the dissent claims that the majority's methodology violates this canon. !d. at
1217-19 (Dyk, J., dissenting in part).
215. Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1201-05 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see
also Ruoyu Roy Wang, Note, Texas Digital Systems v. Telegenix, Inc.: Toward a More
Formalistic Patent Claim Construction Model, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 153, 163-65 (2004)
(noting that dictionaries should be consulted first and before the intrinsic record).
216. See Tex. Digital, 308 F.3d at 1204.
217. Kumar v. Ovonic Battery Co., 351 F.3d 1364, 1368-70 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The heavy
presumption can also be overcome if the patentee clearly defines the claim term in the
prosecution history. See id. at 1371-72.
218. Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (''The
patentee may demonstrate an intent to deviate from the ordinary and accustomed meaning
of a claim term by including in the specification expressions of manifest exclusion or
restriction, representing a clear disavowal of claim scope.").
219. Id.
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The dissent's methodology employing a heavy presumption in
favor of dictionary definitions over the specification greatly favors
the canon against reading limitations from the specification into the
claims. Although the approach references the specification, it does
so later in the construction process and through the lens of the
heavy presumption. This severely limits the influence that the
specification's teachings can have on the resulting claim interpretation. Only in limited circumstances can information in the specification influence the claim's meaning. 220 The dissent's approach,
therefore, can be placed near the right end of the spectrum in Figure
2. From this point forward, this Article will refer to this methodology as the ''heavy presumption methodology." 221

D. En Bane Decision in Phillips v. AWH Corporation: The
Federal Circuit Selects a Claim Interpretation Methodology
On July 12, 2005, the Federal Circuit issued its en bane opinion
in Phillips u. AWH Corp.-Phillips II/. 222 As noted in the en bane
order in Phillips II, 223 the court took the case en bane to review the
two methodologies employed in the panel opinion, Phillips I, and
select a single claim interpretation methodology. 224 The Phillips III
decision, therefore, provides further critical discussion of claim
interpretation methodology. 225 In particular, the court further
analyzes the two methodologies employed by the majority and
dissent in Phillips I and applies the methodology it selects. 226
The Federal Circuit initially examined the proper use of the
specification and dictionaries in claim interpretation. 227 Mter
220. See Phillips v. AWH Corp. (Phillips I), 363 F.3d 1207, 1217-18 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Dyk,
J., dissenting in part) (detailing the limited circumstances under which the specification is
referenced), vacated, 376 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en bane).
221. The methodology is given this name because of its usage of a heavy presumption.
222. Phillips v. AWH Corp. (Phillips Ill), Nos. 03-1269, 03-1286, 2005 WL 1620331 (Fed.
Cir. July 12, 2005) (en bane).
223. See Phillips v. AWH Corp. (Phillips II), 376 F.3d 1382, 1382-83 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en
bane).
224. See Phillips III, 2005 WL 1620331, at *2-4 (noting that the court took the case en bane
to settle the "principle question that this case presents ... the extent to which we should' resort
to and rely on a patent's specification in seeking to ascertain the proper scope of its claims").
225. See id. at *4-16 (discussing and analyzing the different claim interpretation sources
and interpretative canons).
226. See id.; see also id. at *2-3, *17-20.
227. See id. at *7-16.
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discussing the current state of the law in the area, the Federal
Circuit endorsed the specification methodology. 228 The en bane
opinion emphasized the importance of the specification's role in
claim interpretation. 229 This "importance of the specification in
claim construction derives from its statutory role," specifically the
requirement that the specification must describe the claimed
invention. 230 "It is therefore entirely appropriate for a court, when
conducting claim construction, to rely heavily on the written
description for guidance as to the meaning of the claims." 231
The court, in turn, explicitly rejected the heavy presumption
methodology. 232 This methodology, in the court's view, "placed too
much reliance on extrinsic sources such as dictionaries, treatises,
and encyclopedias and too little on intrinsic sources, in particular
the specification and prosecution history." 233 The court was worried
specifically because the heavy presumption methodology requires
the reference to external definitional sources before any reference
is made to the specification. 234 Such a requirement "improperly
restricts the role of the specification in claim construction" and, as
a result, "focuses the inquiry on the abstract meaning of words
rather than on the meaning of claim terms within the context of the
patent."235
Having adopted the specification methodology, the court then
applied the methodology to the claim term ''baffles."236 The court
initially referenced the patent's intrinsic evidence, including the
228. See id. at *9, *13-15 (endorsing usage of the specification and expressly rejecting the
heavy presumption in favor of dictionaries). Not all members of the court agreed with the
court's adoption of the specification methodology. See Phillips III, 2005 WL 1620331, at *22-26
(Mayer, J., dissenting) (arguing that "any attempt to fashion a coherent standard under" the
concept that claim interpretation is a matter of law "is pointless, as illustrated by our many
failed attempts to do so").
·
229. See Phillips III, 2005 WL 1620331, at *7-9 (noting that the specification's important
role in claim interpretation ''has a long pedigree in Supreme Court decisions").
230. See id. at *8-9. The court also focused on the USPTO's heavy reliance on the
specification during prosecution as an additional endorsement of the full use of the
specification during claim interpretation. See id.
231. Id. at *9.
232. See id. *13-15 (rejecting the Texas Digital line of cases that established the heavy
presumption in favor of external definitional sources).
233. Id. at *13
234. Id.
235. Id. at *13-14.
236. See id. at *17-18.
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patent's claims and specification. 237 The claims were seen as not
specifically restricting the claimed baffles placement to any particular angle. 238 The court then turned to the patent's specification.
The en bane court looked at the specification to determine how a
person of ordinary skill in the art would understand the claimed
''baffles."239 The court found that the specification "setD forth
multiple objectives to be served by the baffles recited in the
claims."240 Because the disclosed invention went beyond including
baffles just to deflect projectiles, the invention did not require the
claimed baffles to always be at acute or obtuse angles. 241 The court
concluded that, because the disclosed invention was not limited to
include baffles at only angles other than ninety degrees, the claim
term ''baffles" should not be so limited. 242
The court in Phillips III clearly employs the specification
methodology. The Federal Circuit does not accord the dictionary
definition of ''baffles" a heavy presumption. 243 Instead, the court
follows the same approach as the majority in Phillips I. The
intrinsic evidence, particularly the specification, is referenced early
in the interpretation process, and the specification is fully examined
to determine the extent of the invention disclosed to one skilled in
the relevant art.
Notably, the en bane court in Phillips III reaches a different
conclusion as to the specification's teaching about the invention
than the majority in Phillips I. 244 The en bane court views the extent
of the specification's teachings, and thus the disclosed invention, to
237. See id.
238. See id. at *17 (noting that the claim language did not explicitly limit the angular
orientation of the claimed baffies).
239. See id. at *17.
240. See id. at *17-18 (indicating that the patent's specification disclosed other functions
for the claimed baffles, including provision "structural support" and "an intermediate barrier
wall between the opposite [wall] faces") (citing U.S. Patent No. 4,677,798 (filed Apr. 14, 1986)
(issued July 7, 1987)) (alteration in original).
241. See id. at *18.
242. See id. (noting that, in light of the breadth of the disclosed invention, "the term
'baffies' should not be read restrictively to require that the baffles in each case serve all of the
recited functions").
243. See id. at *17. The court does cite the definition, but does not give the definition any
real weight in the interpretation process. See id.
244. See Phillips III, 2005 WL 1620331, *20-22 (Lourie, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (noting that the en bane court used the same methodology as employed by
the majority in Phillips I, but reached the opposite construction).
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be broader than the majority in Phillips I. Put another way, with
reference to the visual depiction of the specification's teachings in
Figure 1, the court in Phillips III views the area of the disclosed
invention to cover more area than the majority in Phillips I. This
difference does not, however, take away from the fact that the
methodology selected and applied by the en bane court in Phillips
III is similar to the methodology employed by the majority in
Phillips I-the specification methodology. The opinions do not differ
in methodology, but in their understanding of the patent at issue.
Ill. EVALUATING CLAIM INTERPRETATION METHODOLOGIES

The lack of a clear statutory direction leaves methodology
formulation and selection in the courts' hands. The Federal Circuit,
which has exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals, 245 has been the
most active in this area. 246 The panel decision in Phillips I demonstrates the court's activities, with the majority and dissent employing two separate interpretation methodologies. 247 The court's en
bane opinion in Phillips III also evidences the Federal Circuit
playing a major role in this area. 248
A duty to select a single methodology has come with the discretion to create varied methodologies. The Federal Circuit assumed
this duty in Phillips III, when it adopted a unitary methodology-the specification methodology-for itself and lower courts to
use. 249 The consistent usage of one approach to claim interpretation
falls in line with the congressional mandate behind the Federal

245. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2000). But see Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air
Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 834 (2002); Christopher A. Cotropia, "Arising Under"
Jurisdiction and Uniformity in Patent Law, 9 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 253, 286-302
(2003) (explaining how the Holmes decision disturbed the Federal Circuit's exclusive
jurisdiction).
246. See Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation and Information Costs, 9
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 57, 58 (2005) (noting the immense Federal Circuit jurisprudence on
the issue of claim interpretation after the Supreme Court's decision in Markman); Romary &
Michelsohn, supra note 15, at 1889-92; Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 10, at 1124-25
(studying the Federal Circuit's performance in the area of claim interpretation).
247. See generally Phillips v. AWH Corp. (Phillips 1), 363 F.3d 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2004),
vacated, 376 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en bane).
248. See Phillips v. AWH Corp. (Phillips Ill), Nos. 03-1269, 03-1286, 2005 WL 1620331
(Fed. Cir. July 12, 2005) (en bane).
249. See id.

94

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:49

Circuit's creation. 250 Also, the Supreme Court's decision in Markman
concerning claim interpretation arguably requires courts to adopt
a single approach. 251
In addition to the legal reasons, normative rationales exist for
settling on one interpretation methodology for all courts. A single
approach facilitates true substantive review of district court
decisions by the Federal Circuit. If all courts use a single methodology, appellate review can focus on whether district courts properly
executed the methodology, instead of starting the process anew by
selecting a different methodology, followed by construing the claims
accordingly. A unitary methodology approach also eases the burden
on the district courts, allowing them to focus only on properly
implementing the methodology. Furthermore, a single, agreed-upon
methodology also helps those outside the litigation setting to
evaluate patents and their scope. 252 Uncertainty in the methodology
that a court will use severely hampers the ability of parties to
predict the exact scope of exclusivity a patent gives its owner.
Evaluating the available methodologies is the first step in
rationally choosing a single claim interpretation approach. This
Part will undertake a deeper examination of the evaluation process,
first focusing on the need to develop one or more evaluation
benchmarks. Such criteria are needed to facilitate the comparison
among methodologies. Evaluation criteria also instill a normative
baseline into the comparison process, ensuring that the chosen
methodology maximizes the normative goals embedded in the
criteria.
The certainty standard used currently when evaluating claims is
then discussed. Almost all courts and commentators evaluate how
claims are interpreted under this criterion. 253 The Federal Circuit
identified this criterion in its en bane order in Phillips II and
250. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized
Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1989); Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 10, at 1114-17
(discussing the mandate of the Federal Circuit, in particular the mandate in relation to claim
interpretation jurisprudence).
251. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388-91 (1996); Wagner &
Petherbridge, supra note 10, at 1120-24.
252. See Dreyfuss, supra note 250, at 7 (noting how commentators believe that "certainty
and predictability" in patent law can "foster technological growth and industrial innovation
and ... facilitate business planning'').
253. See, e.g., Phillips v. AWH Corp., (Phillips II), 376 F.3d 1382, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en
bane); Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 10, at 1176.
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mentioned it multiple times in its en bane opinion in Phillips 111. 254
The main rationale behind using this criterion is that it ensures
that the resulting interpretation maximizes the public notice
function of patent claims. However, this criterion overlooks the
certainty-maximizing effects of simply choosing a single methodology. In addition, diminishing returns exist as one tries to modify a
methodology to get closer to absolute certainty and uniformity.
Finally, focusing strictly on certainty as the sole standard for
evaluating interpretation methodology overlooks the other and more
important function of patent claims-the substantive function of
defining the patent's scope of exclusivity.

A. Need for Evaluation Criteria
Adopting a criterion or set of criteria for use when evaluating how
a legal instrument is interpreted is nothing new to law. In both
contract interpretation and statutory interpretation, scholars and
courts have discussed which interpretation methods are better. 255
These discussions usually begin by setting forth how the different
approaches will be judged. 256 These judgments are made based on a
defined set of criteria. For example, methods of statutory interpretation have been judged as to their "predictability," their "political
neutrality," their observance to the separation of powers, and their
"pragmatism."257 The criteria used in comparing contract interpretation methods is just as varied. 258
Using evaluation criteria facilitates the comparison of different
methodologies. The only rational way to select among varying
approaches is to judge them against the same standard and compare
254. Phillips III at *11 (discussing how reliance on extrinsic evidence, such as dictionaries,
undermines the "public notice function of patents"); see also id. at *15 (indicating that the
adopted methodology can be implemented with "reasonable certainty and predictability'');
Phillips II, 376 F. 3d at 1383 (asking, in question one, whether "the public notice function of
patent claims [is] better served" under one methodology as opposed to the other).
255. See, e.g., Avery Wiener Katz, The Economics of Form and Substance in Contract
Interpretation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 496, 496-98 (2004); Timothy P. Terrell, Statutory
Epistemology: Mapping the Interpretation Debate, 53 EMORYL.J. 523, 524-25 (2004).
256. See, e.g., Carlos E. Gonzalez, Reinterpreting Statutory Interpretation, 74 N.C. L. REV.
585, 696-718 (1996) (asking which statutory interpretation methodology is "most publicregarding").
257. See Terrell, supra note 255, at 531.
258. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 255, at 497-98 (noting that contract interpretation
methodologies are characterized as either formal or substantive).
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the results. The best scoring method is the one that most closely
meets the evaluation criteria. For example, Eskridge has argued
for a "dynamic" statutory interpretation methodology. 259 He has
suggested such a methodology because it furthers a particular
normative rationale, a criterion that a statute's meaning should
adapt, in some cases, to the current social values. 260 Without a clear
criterion, assessment of Eskridge's dynamic statutory interpretation
methodology becomes difficult, if not impossible. Without evaluation
criteria, one would never be sure if one methodology is truly ''better"
than the other.
Establishing criteria for evaluating methodologies also properly
interjects a normative element into the selection process. Embedded
in any criterion is a normative rationale that the criterion attempts
to maximize. Judging methodologies based on their performance
under a particular criterion helps to ferret out the norm or norms
operating within the interpretative approaches. 261 Therefore, not
only does an evaluation criterion facilitate the assessment and
comparison process, but a criterion also brings the necessary
normative analysis into the selection process. The values that a
methodology furthers are brought to the forefront. Criteria give a
true reason why one methodology is normatively better than
another. If a methodology does not score well under a given
criterion, that methodology is disfavored because it does not further
the normative principle embedded in the criterion. Most do not
quibble with the need for evaluation criteria when trying to choose
among different interpretation regimes. Often much disagreement
exists, however, over the exact criteria to use, and this disagreement
is usually founded on a dispute over the propriety of the normative
rationale underlying the criteria. 262 Currently, such a disagreement
does not exist in the claim interpretation context. Courts and
commentators only really use one criterion--certainty.

259. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479
(1987).
260. Id. at 1482-96 (describing the concept of dynamic statutory interpretation).
261. See Terrell, supra note 255, at 531-32 (noting the norms "at work behind the
interpretative techniques" in the statutory interpretation context).
262. See id. at 523-34 (noting the ferocity of the debate regarding the statutory
interpretation).
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B. Certainty as an Evaluation Criterion
The certainty criterion is the most widely utilized criterion for
evaluating claim interpretation methodologies. 263 Courts and
commentators currently judge claim interpretation methodologies
on whether they provide certainty about the patent claim's
meaning. 264 If a particular method provides predictable results and
others can successfully replicate it, that methodology scores well
under the certainty criterion. 265 Conversely, if a given approach's
resulting claim meaning is tough to predict and duplicate, that
approach fails under the certainty criterion and should not be
used. 266
The certainty criterion is used to ensure that a methodology
furthers the normative goal of providing public notice about the
exact patent scope of exclusivity. If the way that claims are
construed causes claim definitions to be unpredictable for the public
and courts, that method thwarts the notice aspect of patent claims.
Such methodologies would make it difficult for any patent observer
to be sure of a claim term's meaning. 267 An interpretation process
that produces erratic results is also not replicated easily by
reviewing courts, patent holders, and other interested parties. If a
methodology creates uncertainty, it impedes the claim's ability to
communicate the patent's scope to the public and the patent holder.
The usage of the certainty criterion tries to make sure that the
patent claim's public notice function is not hampered, but furthered,
by the claim interpretation methodology used.
The Supreme Court's decision in Markman emphasizes certainty as a main goal for claim interpretation. 268 In Markman, the
Supreme Court concluded that claim interpretation questions were

263. See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390-91 (1996). Other
evaluation criteria have been employed, but not to the extent of the certainty criterion. Nard,
in addition to looking at certainty, considers which methodology observes the "proper
allocation of interpretive authority." Nard, supra note 57, at 64-79.
264. See, e.g., Phillips v. AWH Corp. (Phillips Ill), Nos. 03-1269, 03-1286, 2005 WL
1620331, at *10-13, *15 (Fed. Cir. July 12, 2005) (en bane); Phillips v. AWH Corp. (Phillips
II), 376 F.3d 1382, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en bane).
265. See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 10, at 1176.
266. ld.
267. ld. at 1171-72, 1176.
268. See Markman, 517 U.S. at 390-91.
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"reserved entirely for the court."269 In formulating this conclusion,
the Court addressed what constituted a good claim interpretation
methodology. 270 The Court found it important to ensure that claim
construction promoted certainty and uniformity because "[t]he
limits of a patent must be known for the protection of the patentee,
the encouragement of the inventive genius of others and the
assurance that the subject of the patent will be dedicated ultimately
to the public."271 By providing· certainty, claim construction provides
public notice of the patent claim's subject matter. 272
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Markman, the Federal
Circuit has also focused on establishing a claim interpretation
methodology that furthers the claim's public notice function. 273 In its
recent en bane opinion on claim interpretation, Phillips III, the
Federal Circuit referenced the certainty criterion when justifying
its selection of the specification methodology. The court made a
point to recognize that the methodology scored well under the
criterion. 274 For example, when discussing whether the methodology
can maintain the balance between the competing canons of reading
the claims in light of the specification and not reading limitations
from the specification into the claims, the court concluded that
the methodology could maintain such a balance "with reasonable
certainty and predictability."275
Most commentators have criticized current claim interpretation
under the certainty criterion. 276 They have looked at how the
269. !d. at 372.
270. !d. at 388-91.
271. Id. at 390 (alteration in original) (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp.,
304 u.s. 364, 369 (1938)).
272. !d.
273. See Romary & Michelsohn, supra note 15, at 1892 ("[T]he Federal Circuit ... has
renewed its focus on adequate public notice as perhaps the fundamental constraint on the
claim interpretation process.").
274. See Phillips v. AWH Corp. (Phillips Ill), Nos. 03-1269,03-1286,2005 WL 1620331, at
*15 (Fed. Cir. July 12, 2005) (en bane).
275. !d. Notably, the court's opinion also included statements that evidence some
recognition by the court of the linkage between methodology and claim scope. See id. at *14,
*16 (noting how the heavy presumption methodology "cause[s] the construction of the claim
to be unduly expansive" and the specification methodology creates a claim scope "of the actual
invention more accurately").
276. See Gretchen Ann Bender, Uncertainty and Unpredictability in Patent Litigation: The
Time is Ripe for a Consistent Claim Construction Methodology, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 175, 20917 (2001) (analyzing the reasons behind uncertainty in claim construction); Dave A. Ghatt &
Timothy B. Kang, Claim Interpretation: A Regression to Uncertain Times, 84 J. PAT. &
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Federal Circuit interprets claims and asked which method provides
the most certainty about a claim's meaning or is the most predictable in the meaning that it produces. 277 Like the courts, commentators evaluate methodologies based on whether they further the
claim's public notice function, 278 and they adopt certainty as the
criterion to judge whether a particular approach meets the goal of
public notice.

C. Shortcomings of Certainty as a Criterion
Overemphasis should not be placed on certainty as an evaluation
criterion. To begin, certainty as a criterion does little to differentiate
between methodologies. Regardless of a methodology's specifics, an
inherent certainty is created once courts decide on a single methodology.279 The discretion left to the courts when approaching claim
construction creates an uncertainty itself. Because no statute
describes exactly how courts should interpret claims, observers
must look to the courts for guidance on interpretation issues.
Without clear direction from the courts in the form of a single
methodology, one cannot predict a claim's meaning because of the
uncertainty about which methodology will be used. One does not
know, for example, where on the spectrum in Figure 2 a court's
TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'¥ 456, 464-69 (2002) (arguing that early reference to the specification
creates uncertainty by clouding the proper interpretation of the claims); Ben Hattenbach,
Chickens, Eggs and Other Impediments to Escalating Reliance on Dictionaries in Patent Claim
Construction, 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'¥ 181, 189-90 (2003) (contending that
consulting the dictionary leads to uncertain results); Craig Allen Nard, Certainty, Fence
Building, and the Useful Arts, 74 IND. L.J. 759, 759-62 (1999) (noting that litigation delays
compound the harm caused by uncertainty); Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 10, at 1176
(evaluating the procedural and holistic approach in terms of applicability in "a consistent and
predictable manner"); Wang, supra note 215, at 167-69 (praising a formalist approach that
promotes certainty by minimizing judicial discretion).
277. See, e.g., Hattenbach, supra note 276, at 189-90 (arguing that the procedural approach
produces uncertainty).
278. See supra note 254.
279. Certainty is the driving force behind those commentators who want the Federal
Circuit to adopt a single methodology. See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 10, at 1176;
see also Paul R. Michel, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Must Evolve to Meet the
Challenges Ahead, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1177, 1191 (1999) (noting that "[t]he problem most
frequently mentioned by practitioners" as the source of the uncertainty of the Federal
Circuit's decision "is known as 'panel-dependency"'); Matthew F. Weil & William C. Rooklidge,
Stare Un-Decisis: The Sometimes Rough Treatment of Precedent in Federal Circuit DecisionMaking, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'¥ 791, 804-07 (1998).
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methodology will fall, and thus, how much influence the court will
afford the specification. Once a court selects a point on the spectrum
and publicly identifies it in a decision with precedential value, a
degree of certainty is necessarily achieved. This predictability is
achieved regardless of the adopted methodology's specifics. The
public notice function of patent claims is then furthered. With only
one methodology used, different individuals more likely will interpret the claims in the same manner, and thus, a higher likelihood
of getting a similar result will exist. 280 Every methodology furthers
certainty and uniformity to some degree if all the players in the
patent system use the same methodology.
Adopting a single methodology, however, does not automatically
result in absolute certainty and uniformity. The methodology chosen
can still be unpredictable in application because of the canons it
chooses to use. This will frustrate the public notice function of
patent claims. A methodology whose method cannot be reproduced
uniformly creates a situation that is de facto like the situation in
which a single methodology was never chosen. 281 Thus, a certainty
criterion may still be of some use to courts and commentators. An
assumption is being made, however, that one methodology can lead
to noticeably more certainty than others.
This begs the question of whether any methodology can produce
absolute certainty in claim meaning. That is, does a methodology
exist where courts, patent holders, and patent observers will all
come to the same definition for a particular claim term? Varying
280. Some uncertainty can still exist if different individuals have difficulty implementing
the chosen methodology in the same manner. In fact, depending on the methodology chosen,
a significant amount of unpredictability may remain. See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note
10, at 1176· 77. Others argue that the mere fact that claim interpretation is reviewed de novo
creates substantial uncertainty for district court judges. See Phillips Ill, 2005 WL 1620331,
at *22, *24-25 (Mayer, J. dissenting). Even under these circumstances, however, the results
are still more certain because everyone is using the same approach, taking one variable out
of the interpretation process. This variable removal at least moves closer to uniformity in
result.
281. The differential between the majority opinion in Phillips I and the en bane decision
in Phillips III provides a good example of the uncertainty still present after a single
methodology is adopted. See Phillips Ill, 2005 WL 1620331, at *20-21 (Lourie, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (noting the fact that the decisions reach different results with
the same methodology). The same outcome-use of same methodology but different
results--can also occur under the heavy presumption methodology. See, e.g., Nystrom v. Trex
Co. 374 F.3d 1105, 1110-12 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (facing the possibility of different interpretations
because of the multiple definitions of the term ''board" in different dictionaries).
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degrees of certainty are obtainable, 282 but, for certainty to be a
successful criterion, a significant difference must exist between two
methodologies for one to be clearly superior. Currently, commentators do not universally recognize a single methodology as achieving
a significant degree of certainty and uniformity. 283 At the least, a
real question exists as to whether using certainty as a criterion adds
anything to the evaluation process, particularly when true predictability in claim interpretation may not be possible.
Even if certainty helps distinguish some methodologies from
others, this benefit must be compared against the criterion's failure
to speak to the substantive function of patent claims. Ensuring the
predictability of a claim interpretation methodology does not
address whether the resulting substantive claim scope furthers the
goals of patent law. Certainty may apprise everyone of the claim's
scope of exclusivity, but it does not direct the scope of patent
exclusivity in any given direction. A patent claim's substantive
function is the most important role the claim plays in the patent
system. 284 Any evaluation of interpretation methodology needs to
consider the impact the approach has on the contours of the
resulting patent scope. Such an impact is not considered when
certainty is used as a criterion. Consequently, the criterion fails to
judge methodologies on how they substantively affect patent scope.
Nonetheless, certainty as a criterion should not be completely
discounted. It should still be considered when examining differing
approaches to defining claims. However, in view of its shortcomings,

282. Leaving some uncertainty in the patent context may actually be beneficial. See, e.g.,
Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees' Market Power Without Reducing Innovation
Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97 MICH. L.
REV. 985 (1999).
283. Most argue that the heavy presumption methodology is more predictable and certain
than the specification methodology. See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 10, at 1176
(discussing these two methodologies in the broader context of the holistic and procedural
approach); Wang, supra note 215, at 169-71. However, just-as-convincing arguments exist that
the heavy presumption methodology produces unpredictable results. See Hattenbach, supra
note 276, at 189-90; Jennifer R. Johnson, Out of Context: Texas Digital, the Indefiniteness of
Language, and the Search for Ordinary Meaning, 44 IDEA 521, 532-40 (2004); Joseph Scott
Miller & James A. Hilsenteger, The Proven Key: Roles & Rules for Dictionaries at the Patent
Office and the Courts, 54 AM. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 30-43), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=577262) (noting the many uncertainties introduced under the
current use of dictionaries by the Federal Circuit).
284. See infra Part IV.C.l.
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particularly its ignorance of the patent claim's substantive function,
other criteria must also be considered.
IV. A NEW EvALUATION CRITERION: A METHODOLOGY'S CLAIM
SCOPE PARADIGM

This Article proposes the use of a new evaluation criterion-a
claim interpretation methodology's "claim scope paradigm." A claim
scope paradigm is the particular view, or perspective, on the proper
patent scope encoded into an interpretation method. This view on
patent scope can cause a methodology to consistently produce a
specific type of patent protection. For example, a methodology may
have a claim scope paradigm that consistently interprets claims to
have a broad area of protection because the methodology's paradigm
considers such broad protection to be correct. Another methodology
may have a claim scope paradigm that always produces narrow
claim interpretations. 285
Once a methodology's claim scope paradigm is identified, that
particular approach's propriety can be judged based on the claim
scope paradigm's acceptability. If a methodology's claim scope
paradigm promotes a favored patent theory or policy, that methodology scores well under this criterion. For example, if broad protection
for the invention is favored, then a claim interpretation methodology whose claim scope paradigm results in broad invention protection should be selected. In contrast, if courts or policymakers favor
a narrow claim scope, an interpretation approach whose paradigm
results in narrow protection should be adopted. The benefit to using
claim scope paradigm as a criterion is that it speaks directly to the
substantive function of patent claims. Claim scope paradigm addresses how a methodology affects patent protection, or in other
words, the scope of exclusivity a patent claim creates. Once the
claim scope paradigm is identified, courts can judge methodologies
based on their substantive effect.

285. This example overly simplifies the concept of claim scope paradigm and how a
particular claim interpretation methodology can have and implement such a paradigm. Rarely
is any patent theory as basic as supporting extremely broad patent scope or narrow patent
scope. Most patent theories support a particular patent scope as it relates to other factors in
the invention's technological industry or the invention itself. See Burk & Lemley, supra note
1, at 1596-615 (cataloging and explaining different patent theories).
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For a claim scope paradigm to be a viable criterion for evaluating
methodologies, two points must be established. First, claim
interpretation methodologies actually must contain Claim scope
paradigms. If such paradigms are impossible to locate or identify,
they cannot be used to evaluate methodologies. Second, some benefit
to judging methodologies based on their claim scope paradigm must
exist. Without some normative rationale for using claim scope
paradigms as a criterion, the identification and comparison effort
under the criterion is worthless and wasteful. This Part will explore
each of these points in detail, concluding that claim scope paradigms
do exist, are identifiable, and are extremely useful in grading a
particular methodology and furthering patent theory. By identifying
a methodology's claim scope paradigm, courts can recognize that
choosing among interpretation methods is tied directly to choosing
a proper patent scope. Afurther benefit is that the recognition of the
claim scope paradigm facilitates the use of claim interpretation
methodology as a highly effective patent policy lever.

A. Identification of an Interpretation Methodology's Claim Scope
Paradigm
Most claim interpretation methodologies include a claim scope
paradigm. The paradigm is encoded into the methodology through
the particular interpretation canons that the methodology uses.
Interpretation canons dictate how informational sources affect
the resulting claim definition, and as the usage of the available
informational sources change, so does the claim terms' definition.
Using one interpretation canon may produce a particular claim
definition, while using another on the same claim term can produce
a different definition. The different definitions reflect a difference
in patent scope. As a methodology is used in various cases, the
methodology produces the same differential in claim scope in every
case by using the same set of canons. This difference in the scope of
patent protection is a direct product of the canon or canons that a
methodology chooses to employ. 286 The specific breadth of a claim's
definition is the product of the defining process itself. This direct
286. See Nard, supra note 57, at 4 ("Indeed, the interpretative tools used by a court directly
affect the extent of the patentee's property interest, and, therefore, where the patentee's
competitors may and may not tread.").
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effect on claim definition in every case is a claim interpretation
methodology's claim scope paradigm.
To better illustrate the existence and identification of claim scope
paradigms in interpretation methodologies, the two interpretation
canons regarding the specification are revisited. 287 The former canon
instructed the construer to read the claims in light of the specification, while the latter cautioned the construer against reading
limitations from the specification into the claims. Finding it difficult
to implement both canons together, courts usually favor one canon
over the other. Depending on which canon is emphasized, the
specification has either significant or little to no influence on the
resulting interpretation. 288
By choosing one canon over the other, a methodology adopts a
specific claim scope paradigm. The two canons speak to the
relationship between the defined claim scope and the specification's
teachings regarding the patentee's inventive activities. The former
canon ensures the patentee's inventive activities influence the
resulting definition, while the latter does not. If a methodology
limits the resulting claim interpretation to the specification, that
methodology constrains the patent's scope to the disclosed invention's specifics. In contrast, if a methodology allows a claim's
meaning to deviate significantly from the specification, the disclosed
invention information does not constrain the resulting claim scope.
The specific claim language under construction does not produce the
difference in claim scope under these two methodologies. Instead,
the particular methodology that a canon employs directly produces
the contours of the resulting claim scope in both cases. These
characteristics of the resulting claim scope define a methodology's
claim scope paradigm. To provide further examples of how a
methodology can have an identifiable claim scope paradigm, the two
recent approaches to claim interpretation will be examined. In
addition, the Federal Circuit's recent analysis of these two approaches in Phillips III will be discussed.

287. See supra Part II.B.
288. This variation is demonstrated in Figure 2, supra p. 82.
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1. Claim Scope Paradigm of the Specification Methodology
The specification methodology, characterized by full and early use
of the specification in the interpretation process, has an identifiable
claim scope paradigm. The methodology's claim scope paradigm
limits the patent's scope of protection to the full invention disclosed
in the specification. This claim scope paradigm can be identified by
examining the particular interpretation canons that the methodology employs. In particular, to find the claim scope paradigm, the
methodology is inspected to see the relationship it enforces between
the resulting claim definition and other sources of invention-related
information.
In Phillips I, the majority used the specification methodology. 289
By looking at the specification early in the interpretation process,
the majority focused on all the information about the invention and,
specifically, the role the claimed ''baffles" played in the invention.
The court looked to see how the inventor, in the context of the
entirety of his invention, used the claim term ''baffles."290 Mter
inspecting the specification, the court concluded that one of the core
properties of the patentee's invention is the modular building
walls' impact-resistant nature. 291 The patent called for the baffles'
placement at an orientation other than ninety degrees to effectuate
the invention's impact resistance. 292 The patent's drawings support
such a conclusion, depicting the baffles at an orientation other than
ninety degrees. 293 The majority viewed the specification as describing the invention to include baffles with only an orientation other
than ninety degrees. 294 As the majority stated: "Inspection of the
patent shows that baffles angled at other than 90° is the only
embodiment disclosed in the patent; it is the invention. It is
impossible to derive anything else from the specification."295

289. Phillips v. AWH Corp. (Phillips I), 363 F.3d 1207, 1213-14 (Fed. Cir. 2004), vacated,
376 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004} (en bane).
290. Id. at 1213 (quoting Comark Commc'ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp. 156 F.3d 1182, 1187 (Fed.
Cir. 1998)).
291. Id.
292. Id. at 1213-14.
293. Id. at 1213 (noting Figures 6 and 12 of U.S. Patent No. 4,677, 789 (flled Apr. 14, 1986)
(issued July 7, 1987)).
294. Id. at 1213-14.
295. Id. at 1214.
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The majority then took its.specification-based understanding of
the patentee's invention-the impact-resistant features of the
invention and the baffles' non-ninety degree orientation-and used
it to interpret the claims. Accordingly, the court interpreted the
claim term ''baffles" to mean baffles at an angular orientation to the
outer shell other than ninety degrees. Following the specification
methodology, the court determined the invention's parameters from
the specification's teachings and interpreted the djsputed claim
term in light of these teachings. More specifically, the court
ensured that its interpretation of ''baffles" did not expand beyond
the invention described in the specification. 296 This approach has
an identifiable claim scope paradigm, limiting claim scope to the
disclosed invention. By using the specification fully and early in the
interpretation process, the specification methodology limits the
resulting claim scope to the specification's total teachings. Under
the constraints encoded into the methodology, the term ''baffles"
could not be given a meaning that expanded beyond the invention's
scope disclosed in the specification. 297 By allowing the specification
to significantly influence the resulting claim's definition, the
methodology, in turn, prevents the claim's literal scope from
expanding beyond the patentee's inventive activities described in
the specification. The methodology employs a claim scope paradigm
that tunes the claim's meaning to what the patentee actually
invented.
The Federal Circuit, in Phillips III, came to the same conclusion
regarding how the specification methodology impacts the contours
of the resulting claim scope. 298 Although the court did not fully
explore the specification methodology's claim scope paradigm, the
Phillips III opinion laid a foundation for the paradigm's recognition.
The court discussed the linkage between heavy reliance on the
specification and characteristics of the interpreted claim. The court
noted that by interpreting the claims "in the context of the particular patent" by using the full teachings of the specification, the
296. Id.
297. There can be disagreement, however, as to the scope of the disclosed invention. See,
e.g., Phillips v. AWH Corp. (Phillips Ill), Nos. 03-1269, 03-1286, 2005 WL 1620331, at *17-*18
(Fed. Cir. July 12, 2005) (en bane) (coming to a different understanding than the majority in
Phillips I as to the scope of the disclosed invention).
298. See id. at *7-9 (discussing the specification's importance in claim interpretation and
the determination of the patentee's invention).
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resulting construction "is likely to capture the scope of the actual
invention more accurately." 299
The same claim scope paradigm can be found in another Federal
Circuit case, Wang Laboratories, Inc. v. America Online, Inc. 300
In Wang, the court construed the term "frame" in a claim concerning computer systems that displayed graphical and textual information.301 The claimed "frame" is the vehicle through which the
invention's graphical and textual information is sent and
processed. 302 The patentee argued for the meaning of "frame" to
include frames containing either bitmapped display information or
character-based display information. 303 The accused infringers
asserted that "frame" should include only display systems that
followed character-based protocols. 304 The ordinary, plain meaning
of term "frame," as generally used in the computer display arts,
includes both bit and character systems. 305
The court, following the specification methodology, first consulted
the specification, 306 looking at the specification to understand the
patentee's invention. The court found that "[t]he only system that
[was] described and enabled in the [patent's] specification and
drawings used a character-based protocol."307 The court did not find
any description in the specification of other types of display
protocols, including bit-based systems. 308 Based on its analysis, the
court concluded that "the specification would not be so understood
by a person skilled in the field of the invention" to teach such a
person how to use frames containing bitmapped display information.309
299. See id. at *16 (noting that by using the full teachings of the specification, the resulting
interpretation will both properly use the specification's information but not improperly limit
the claims to the disclosed embodiments).
300. 197 F.3d 1377, 1381·83 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Wang is cited by Wagner and Petherbridge
as the exemplar for the holistic approach to claim interpretation. See Wagner & Petherbridge,
supra note 10, at 1135·36.
301. Wang, 197 F.3d at 1379·80.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 1381.
304. Id.
305. Id. (deriving the "general usage" of the term "frame" from the testimony and the
parties' stipulations).
306. Id. at 1382·83.
307. Id. at 1382 (basing its conclusion on both the specification's text and drawings).
308. Id.
309. Id.
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Once the court in Wang understood the extent of the specification's teachings about the invention to those skilled in the art, it
applied this understanding to its construction of the claim term at
issue. Thus, the term "frame" was interpreted to include only frames
containing character-based display information. 310 The defined
claim was not allowed to expand beyond what the court understood
as the patented invention. The court noted that the claims may be
interpreted beyond the preferred embodiment, but they may not
encompass subject matter beyond the disclosed invention or, in
other words, what the specification described and taught. 311
The Wang court's approach is similar to the approach of the
court in Phillips III and the majority's approach in Phillips I. The
claim interpretation methodology employed in Wang examines the
specification early in the interpretation process and uses its complete teachings. As in Phillips III and Phillips I, the Wang court
ensured that the interpreted claims did not exceed the invention
described and enabled in the specification. 312 The specification
methodology's full and early use limits the scope of the claims to the
invention the patent teaches. 313 The patent's disclosure sets a ceiling
for the claim's meaning, and thus, the literal scope of exclusivity
afforded to the patent. By setting this limit, the methodology used
in Wang implements the same claim scope paradigm adopted in
Phillips III and used in the majority's decision in Phillips I, which
limited the resulting claim scope to the disclosed invention. A single
claim scope paradigm for the specification methodology, therefore,
clearly exists and is identifiable. Figure 3, below, modifies Figure 1
to demonstrate the claim scope paradigm implemented through the
specification methodology. 314

310. Id. at 1382-83.
311. Id. at 1383 (noting that interpreting claims beyond the preferred embodiment is "a
question specific to the content of the specification, the context in which the embodiment is
described, the prosecution history, and if appropriate the prior art").
312. Id.
313. Id.; see Phillips v. AWH Corp. (Phillips 1), 363 F.3d 1207, 1213-14 (Fed. Cir. 2004),
vacated, 376 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en bane).
314. Figure 3 depicts the maximum claim meaning under the specification methodology.
The specification methodology can result in a claim meaning that is narrower than the
specification's constructive teachings. That is, a patentee may choose to claim less than the
full invention described and enabled in the specification for reasons of maintaining validity.
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2. Claim Scope Paradigm of the Heavy Presumption
Methodology
The heavy presumption methodology, which uses a heavy
presumption in favor of dictionary definitions over the specification,
implements a different claim scope paradigm. The methodology's
claim scope paradigm does not limit the claim interpretation to the
specification's teachings. Instead, the claim scope paradigm that the
heavy presumption methodology employs only loosely ties the
claim's definition, if at all, to the disclosed invention.
The dissent in Phillips I provides a good example of the heavy
presumption methodology's claim scope paradigm. In particular, the
dissent's discussion demonstrates the disconnect that the heavy
presumption methodology creates between a claim's meaning and
the specification's teaching. 315 The dissent, following the heavy
315. Phillips I, 363 F.3d at 1216-19 (Dyk, J., dissenting in part).
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presumption methodology, used a dictionary initially to obtain the
claim term's ordinary meaning under dispute. 316 Once the ordinary
meaning is determined, the heavy presumption takes effect and can
only be overcome in limited circumstances. 317
Evidence to overcome the presumption can be found in the
specification, but it must come in the form of affirmative statements
limiting the claim term at issue, such as limiting ''baffles" to a
particular angular orientation. 318 Notably, the dissent did not ask
what invention the specification describes or whether the specification supported the full range of''baffles" encompassed in the term's
ordinary meaning. 319 No inquiry was made as to whether the
patentee invented a ninety degree baffle, and accordingly, whether
it was described and enabled in the specification. The dissent found
nothing to rebut the heavy presumption and therefore adopted the
ordinary meaning of''baffles" obtained from a dictionary. 320
The heavy presumption methodology contains its own identifiable
claim scope paradigm, which disassociates claim scope from the
disclosed invention. The specification's teachings do not tie down a
claim's definition under this claim scope paradigm. By first looking
for a claim term's ordinary meaning in an external definitional
source, the methodology can produce claim meanings unrelated to
the invention described in the specification. The heavy presumption
methodology then makes only minimal efforts to relink the claim's
definition. with the specification's teachings. At best, a loose
relationship is created in those limited circumstances where the
heavy presumption is overcome and information from the specification influences the claim's definition. In most cases, the inventionrelated information in the specification plays no role in the
definitional process. Consequently, the methodology's claim scope
paradigm produces a patent scope unbounded by the patentee's
specific inventive activities.

316. Id. at 1216-17 (Dyk, J., dissenting in part).
317. Id. at 1217 (Dyk, J., dissenting in part) (finding no support for adding additional
structural limitations to the ordinary meaning of ''baffies").
318. I d. at 1217-18 (Dyk, J., dissenting in part) (noting that "[t]he specification of the '798
patent contains no such language clearly limiting the claims to a specific structure").
319. Id.; cf Phillips I, 363 F.3d at 1213-14 (demonstrating how the majority examined the
specification for a description of the invention).
320. Phillips I, 363 F.3d at 1219 (Dyk, J., dissenting in part).
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The Federal Circuit came to a similar conclusion in Phillips 111. 321
Again, as with its discussion of the specification methodology, the
court did not fully analyze the heavy presumption methodology's
claim scope paradigm. But its discussion regarding the claim scope
the methodology produces is a significant step in this paradigm's
recognition. The court viewed the heavy presumption methodology
as disconnecting the patent's teachings regarding the invention
and the claims' ultimate construction. 322 The methodology's ''heavy
reliance on the dictionary divorced from the intrinsic evidence risks
transforming the meaning of the claim term to the artisan into the
meaning of the term in the abstract, out of its particular context,
which is the specification." 323
The majority's decision in SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc. 324 provides another example of this claim scope paradigm. The patents at issue in SuperGuide laid claim to on-screen,
interactive programming· guides for televisions. 325 The earliest
patent at issue, U.S. Patent No. 4,751,578, was filed in May 1985
and issued in 1988. 326 The patent's specification teaches how to use
its invention to mix the on-screen programming guide information
with television signals received via antenna or cable so that both
could be displayed simultaneously on the television. 327 The first
claim in the patent describes a "mixer" element "for mixing a
regularly received television signal with the signal generated by the
microcontroller" to create the on-screen guide. 328
In June 2000, SuperGuide sued a group of satellite television
providers. 329 Notably, the accused devices, all set-top boxes that
receive broadcast satellite transmissions, received digital television
signal transmissions to be displayed on a satellite subscriber's
321. See Phillips v. AWH Corp. (Phillips Ill), Nos. 03-1269,03-1286,2005 WL 1620331, at
*15 (Fed. Cir. July 12, 2005) (en bane).
322. See id. at *13-15.
323. Id. at *14. The court concludes that the heavy presumption methodology ''will
systematically cause the construction of the claim to be unduly expansive." Id.
324. 358 F.3d 870 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
325. Id. at 875-76.
326. Id. at 875.
327. Id. at 875-76 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 4,751,578 (filed May 28, 1985) (issued June 14,
1988)).
328. Id. at 876 (emphasis removed) (quoting U.S. Patent No.4, 751,578 (filed May 28, 1985)
(issued June 14, 1988)).
329. Id. at 873-74.
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television. 330 The defendants' main argument was that the first
claim in the patent, and certain other claims SuperGuide asserted,
required the mixing of analog television signals with the on-screen
guide and therefore did not cover digital televisions signals. 331
The majority reversed the district court's interpretation and
concluded that the claim term "television signals" includes all
television signals, regardless of their format. 332 The majority used
the heavy presumption methodology to arrive at their claim
interpretation. 333 The court first looked at the ordinary meaning of
the claim term "television signal," determining that it did not limit
the type of television signal, and therefore, an analog limitation was
inappropriate. 334 The court further noted that "neither 'analog' nor
'digital' appears in any of the asserted claims." 335 The ordinary
meaning of the claim term was set.
The majority then turned to the specification, but only to
determine whether the heavy presumption in favor of the ordinary
meaning was overcome. It found nothing in the specification
demonstrating that the patentee explicitly acted as his own
lexicographer or disclaimed any part of the ordinary meaning. 336
Nowhere did the patentee "explicitly limit the disputed claim
language" to analog signals. 337 Nor was there anything "in the
written description ... that precludes ... the claimed invention from
receiving video data in digital format." 338 The majority concluded
that the heavy presumption was not overcome and the claim
language's plain meaning supported the broad definition of
"television signal." 339
330. Id. at 873.
331. Id. at 876-77.
332. Id. at 879-80.
333. Id.
334. ld. at 878-80 (''The claim language does not limit the disputed phrases to any
particular type of technology or specify a particular type of signal format, such as analog or
digital.").
335. Id. at 878.
336. Id. at 879-80 (indicating that the court found "nothing in the written description of the
'578 patent, much less the claim language, that precludes the mixer of the claimed invention
from receiving video data in digital format").
337. I d. (noting further that "[h]ad the patentees intended to limit the disputed claim terms
to 'analog' technology, they could have easily done so by explicitly modifying the disputed
claim language with the term 'analog"') (emphasis added).
338. Id. at 880 (emphasis added).
339. Id. ("We find no reason here to limit the scope of the claimed invention to analog
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As in the dissent's opinion in Phillips I, the heavy presumption
methodology used in SuperGuide disconnects the resulting claim
scope from the specification's teachings about the patentee's
invention. Consequently, the scope of patent protection can extend
well beyond the patentee's actual invention. This claim scope
paradigm takes effect through the methodology's presumption that
the disclosed invention's specifics does not restrain the patent's
scope.
The resulting claim scope in SuperGuide included all television
signals, even though the specification focused on mixing a programming guide with analog signals. 340 In fact, digital television signals
were not broadcast until well after the patent's filing. 341 A person
skilled in the art at the time of the patent's filing would not have
understood, based on the patent, that the on-screen guide invention
was to be used with what were at that time nonexistent digital
television signals. 342 As the concurrence stated, "[t]he majority's
claim constructions expand the scope of the '578 patent far beyond
what the named inventors say they actually invented in their
application, and what it describes and enables." 343 ''The inventors
here most assuredly did not invent a system that receives digital
signals; their patent cannot therefore cover such systems."344
Other interpretation canons exist that may reign in the resulting
interpretation, bringing it closer to the specification's teachings on
the invention. 345 However, under the current heavy presumption
technology, when 'regularly received television signals,' i.e., video data, is broad enough to
encompass both formats and those skilled in the art knew both formats could be used for
video.").
340. See id. at 896-98 (Michel, J., concurring) (stating that the patent did not describe or
enable "systems for receiving signal technology that was not then in use by the television
industry").
341. ld. at 897 (Michel, J., concurring) (citing expert testimony that digital television
signals were not in use when the patent was filed in 1985).
342. ld. at 896-98 (Michel, J., concurring) (citing testimony).
343. ld. at 896 (Michel, J., concurring).
344. ld. at 898 (Michel, J., concurring).
345. See Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Bryson, J.,
concurring) (noting that patent protection cannot extend beyond what "the applicant has
actually conceived and enabled"); Rhine v. Casio, Inc., 183 F.3d 1342, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(demonstrating that the canon of interpretation dictating that claims must be interpreted as
valid prevents a resulting claim definition from going beyond the specification's teachings);
SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Labs. Corp., 859 F.2d 878, 882 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (noting
that patent doctrine requires claims to have the same meaning for purposes of determining
validity and infringement).
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methodology, these canons rarely take hold. Using a heavy presumption in favor of dictionary definitions ensures that courts first
reference outside sources, not the specification. 346 Once the ordinary
meaning is determined from a dictionary, the heavy presumption
entrenches this meaning. 347 The presumption can be overcome only
under limited circumstances in which the specification affirmatively
teaches away from the ordinary meaning. The heavy presumption
methodology does not provide an opportunity to check for complete
continuity between the claims and the specification. 348 The dissent
in Phillips I and the majority in SuperGuide provide excellent
examples of this phenomenon, as those opinions never spoke to
whether the claims, as interpreted, were valid, or whether the
specification fully supported the breadth of the presumed ordinary
claim meaning. 349 Instead, the methodology views the specification
as only limiting, as opposed to supporting, the claim's definition. As
the court in Phillips III characterized it, the methodology starts
with the dictionary definition and only then starts "whittling it
down." 350
·
Therefore, the heavy presumption methodology's claim scope
paradigm is de facto erratic relative to the specification's teachings
regarding the invention. The methodology moves the claim term's
meaning from the context of the patent to the abstract. 351 This
erratic nature results from the methodology's inability to establish
a fixed relationship between the defined claim and the disclosed
invention. Figure 4, below, modifies Figure 1 to depict a potential
claim scope under the heavy presumption methodology. Because the
346. See Wang, supra note 215, at 165-69.
347. See id.
348. In certain cases, the court, following the heavy presumption methodology, considered
whether the interpreted claim met the specification requirements. See Johnson Worldwide
Assocs., Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 993 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (ensuring that the written
description requirement is met). In Johnson, however, the court did not inquire into the
specification requirements on its own volition, but rather it was prompted to do so by the
defendant's arguments. ld. (referencing Zebco's argument).
349. The parties' arguments could have dictated this fact. However, both decisions
demonstrate that checks to link the interpreted claims and the specification are not an
inherent part of the heavy presumption methodology. See Phillips v. AWH Corp. (Phillips I),
363 F.3d 1207, 1216-19 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Dyk, J., dissenting in part); SuperGuide Corp. v.
DirectTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 878-80 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
350. Phillips v. AWH Corp. (Phillips Ill), Nos. 03-1269,03-1286, 2005 WL 1620331, at *14
(Fed. Cir. July 12, 2005) (en bane).
351. See id.
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resulting claim scope is tied only loosely to the patent's specification,
the claim scope can potentially expand well beyond the specification
or even exclude parts of the specification. 352

Constructive
Patent
Specification

Literal
Patent
Specification

Disclosed
Invention

Potential
Claim
Interpretation
Under the
Heavy Presumption
Methodology

Figure 4

B. Evaluating Claim Interpretation Methodologies Based on Their
Claim Scope Paradigm
The examples above demonstrate that claim scope paradigms do
exist in claim interpretation methodologies and that they are
identifiable. The next step involves using this new criterion to
evaluate claim interpretation methodologies. Evaluation simply
352. See, e.g., K-2 Corp. v. Salomon S.A., 191 F.3d 1356, 1362-65 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (adopting
an ordinary meaning of"permanently affixed" under the heavy presumption methodology that
yielded a narrower claim scope by excluding attachment via a screw). This contradicts the
Federal Circuit's assumption that the heavy presumption methodology will "systematically
cause the construction of the claim to be unduly expansive." See Phillips III, 2005 WL
1620331, at *14.
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requires determining what claim scope paradigm the evaluator
wishes to further. 353 Once this is established, the different methodologies are examined to determine whether they possess the favored
claim scope paradigm. To score well under this criterion, a methodology needs to implement, or at least come close to implementing,
the preferred claim scope paradigm.
A major difference between claim scope paradigm and certainty
as a criterion is that only one general concept of certainty354 exists
while there are many claim scope paradigms. To actually perform
the evaluation process under the claim scope paradigm criterion, the
specific paradigm sought must first be chosen. This choice involves
a normative determination, asking what is the optimal claim scope?
The answer to this question is beyond this Article's scope. 355
However, the two recent methodologies' claim scope paradigms
can be reexamined to see what patent theory an evaluator would
need to support for that methodology to score well under this
criterion. Put another way, each methodology's claim scope paradigm can be further analyzed to determine what patent protection
theory the paradigm furthers. With this understanding, scoring
methodologies under the claim scope criterion is easier. If a
methodology creates claim definitions that further the evaluator's
theory regarding the proper patent scope, presumably the same
evaluator will prefer that methodology.

353. The Federal Circuit failed to perform this step in Phillips III. See generally Phillips
III, 2005 WL 1620331, at *14. Although it may be implied from its favoring of the specification
methodology, the court does not identify the particular patent theory it is trying to effectuate.
Such a failure to identify the preferred patent theory is not surprising, considering the
Federal Circuit historically has shown a lack of interest in patent law scholarship. See Craig
Allen Nard, Toward a Cautious Approach to Obeisance: The Role of Scholarship in Federal
Circuit Patent Law Jurisprudence, 39 Hous. L. REV. 667, 678-81 (2002) (demonstrating that
scholarship is rarely cited by the Federal Circuit).
354. However, varying degrees of certainty can exist.
355. Other commentators, however, have answered the question, but not surprisingly, their
answers are not the same. See, e.g., F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for
Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697 (2001) (arguing that patent rights should
be afforded the same scope as property rights); Edmund W. Kitch, supra note 6 (calling for
patent scope to take into account the prospect theory of patent rights); Merges & Nelson,
supra note 1 (favoring reduced patent scope to encourage competition).
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1. Competitive Innovation Theory Supports the Selection of the
Specification Methodology
The specification methodology's claim scope paradigm creates a
patent scope limited by the disclosed invention. This methodology
uses this paradigm to achieve its goal of interpreting claims to
encompass what the patentee actually invented. This claim scope
paradigm most closely implements the "competitive innovation"
patent theory. 356 The specification methodology, by limiting the
interpreted claim scope to the patentee's inventive activities, tries
to facilitate competition in the marketplace, as opposed to giving the
patentee near-monopoly power. 357 The specification methodology
would therefore score well under the claim scope paradigm criterion
if an evaluator looks for a methodology that furthers the competitive
innovation theory of patents.
The competitive innovation patent theory asserts that patents are
needed only to provide an incentive to invent? 58 According to this
approach, patent protection is needed primarily to overcome the
public good nature of intellectual property. 359 With patent protection, the potential inventor has some assurance that others can be
prevented from copying the invention. 360 Therefore, the investor has
356. The label "competitive innovation" as used to describe the following theory is taken
from Burk and Lemley's recent work on patent policy levers. See Burk & Lemley, supra note
1, at 1604.
357. Id. at 1604-07 (explaining the competitive innovation theory).
358. Id. at 1605-07.
359. See Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for
Defeating Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 667, 680-81 (2004) (discussing the "free rider
problem" that the public good nature of invention creates and how it "undercut[s] the
incentive to invent"); Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use
and the Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81, 104-05 (2004) (''The production of patentable
inventions is understood to be different from other commercial activity because the
investment in new ideas, unlike the investment in capital equipment or materials, is assumed
to be appropriable by competitors at very little expense."); see also Burk & Lemley, supra note
1, at 1605 (indicating that "information is a public good for which consumption is
nonrivalrous-that is, one person's use of the information does not deprive others of the
ability to use it").
360. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated Theory of
Intellectual Property, 88 VA. L. REV. 1455, 1466-67 (2002). Parchomovsky and Siegelman
argue that:
[A]bsent legal protection, competitors would copy such works without incurring
the initial costs of producing them. Unauthorized reproduction would drive down
the market price to the cost of copying, original authors and inventors would not
be able to recover their expenditures on authorship and R&D, and, as a result,
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a potential to recoup research and development costs, thereby
creating an incentive to invent. 361 The competitive innovation theory
views patents as providing only an ex ante incentive to create the
invention. 362
After the invention's creation, the competitive innovation theory
argues that competition, not monopoly power, provides the best way
to encourage actual innovation in the marketplace. 363 Patent law
and exclusivity is no longer needed to prompt the inventor to
further develop and commercialize the invention. 364 Competition will
provide enough ex post incentive after the invention's creation to
stimulate its development and improvement, and to make it
commercially viable and beneficial. 365 Companies will innovate to

too few inventions and expressive works would be created.
Id. at 1467.
361. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974) (''The patent laws
promote this progress by offering a right of exclusion for a limited period as an incentive to
inventors to risk the often enormous costs in terms of time, research, and development.");
Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1605; Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in
Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 995-96 (1997) (noting that by giving the
inventor "control over the use and distribution of their ideas," intellectual property law
"encourage[s] them to invest efficiently in the production of new ideas and works of
authorship").
362. See Mark. A. Lemley, supra note 5, at 129-30.
363. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1605-07 (citing the telecommunications industry
as an empirical example). Innovation is the combination of invention and investment, in
which "invention of itself produces no economic effect, while patent-based innovation has a
positive impact on the economic system as new industries and new goods displace the old."
Hilton Davis Chern. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1529 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(Newman, J., concurring) (citing JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND
DEMOCRACY (3d ed. 1950)).
364. The competitive innovation theory stands in sharp contrast to ex post justifications
for patent law, such as the prospect theory, where patent protection is seen as crucial to
development and commercialization ofthe invention. See Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander,
Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L. REV. 305 (1992) (reftning the prospect theory by
focusing on rent dissipation in patent law); Kieff, supra note 355 (articulating the
commercialization theory of patent law); Kitch, supra note 6, at 276-78 (describing the
prospect theory of patents); Lemley, supra note 5, at 130-31.
365. Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1604-07 (noting that ''Ken Arrow has argued that
competition, not monopoly, best spurs innovation because, to simplify greatly, companies in
a competitive marketplace will innovate in order to avoid losing, while monopolists can afford
to be lazy") (citing Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Research for
Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609, 619-20 (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Researched. 1962)).
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avoid losing their market position, and therefore, monopolists will
be unable to remain dormant. 366
The competitive innovation theory advocates a narrow scope for
patent rights. Patents should protect only particular ways to
compete in the marketplace; they should not give patent holders
complete monopolies. 367 The competitive innovation theory argues
for patents to give less than perfect monopoly control of the
market. 368 Therefore, the competitive innovation theory suggests a
narrow patent scope as the best way to ensure this imperfect
control. 369
The specification methodology can be viewed as implementing a
competitive innovation patent theory through its claim scope
paradigm. The resulting claim scope under the approach is tailored
to. the patentee's invention. 370 More specifically, the range of the
invention's embodiments that the specification teaches to one skilled
in the art limits the literal scope of the claims. Consequently, the
patentee does not gain control over every implementation of the
invention unless the specification teaches every implementation.
The patentee gets enough protection to exclude others from copying
the patentee's exact work, but not such broad protection as would
likely give the patentee monopoly power.
The specification methodology, however, does not perfectly
implement the competitive innovation· patent theory. The resulting
claim scope goes further than the specific embodiments described in
the specification. 371 The competitive innovation theory requires
patents to ''be narrowly circumscribed to particular implementations
of an invention, and ... generally [does] not give the patentee the

366. See id. at 1604.
367. Id. at 1605-07.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 1607 ("Competition advocates would argue that, at the very least, patent rights
should be narrow and should give less than perfect monopoly control.").
370. See Phillips v. AWH Corp. (Phillips III), Nos. 03-1269,03-1286, 2005 WL 1620331, *16
(Fed. Cir. July 12, 2005) (en bane) (indicating that the specification methodology "is likely to
capture the scope of the actual invention more accurately" than other methodologies).
371. See id. at *16 (noting that "it is important to keep in mind that the purposes of the
specification are to teach and enable those of skill in the art to make and use the invention");
Wang Labs., Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 197 F.3d 1377, 1379-82 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (looking at the
specification to determine what someone skilled in the art would understand to be the
disclosed invention's scope); see also supra notes 307-12 and accompanying text; Figure 3,
supra p. 109.
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right to control competition in an economic market."372 The specification methodology gives more protection than that, limiting claim
scope to the constructive specification rather than the specification's
literal teachings. The methodology allows the claim scope to extend
to the invention's embodiments that one skilled in the art would
think of, not just those that the patentee specifically considered.
Additionally, the methodology does not consider the patent's actual
industry or whether the resulting claim scope will or will not give
the patentee monopoly control. Instead, the methodology focuses on
the patent document and the teachings on the invention.
The specification methodology's claim scope paradigm is still close
to implementing, at the least, what can be considered a "modified"
form of the competitive innovation theory. 373 The claim scope
paradigm gives the patentee protection broader than the specific
embodiments, but still limited to those embodiments constructively
disclosed in the specification. 374 Thus, if an evaluator wants to
further the competitive innovation theory of patent protection, the
specification methodology should be selected. The specification
methodology's claim scope paradigm creates claim definitions that
372. Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1605.
373. See Figure 2, supra p. 34. The specification methodology's implementation of a
modified competitive innovation theory appears to be similar to a middle ground patent scope
that Duffy identified in his work critiquing the prospect theory. See John F. Duffy, Rethinking
the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. Cm. L. REV. 439, 499-500 (2004). As Duffy describes it:
A very narrow definition of patent rights-for example, covering only that
particular laser-can be rejected because such narrowly defined rights will not
allow the inventor to capture the benefits of investments in developing the laser.
In other words, the investments to develop the laser will have enormous
spillover effects because of the narrow definition of the patentee's property
rights. The choice between a particular class of lasers and all lasers is more
difficult. The issue should turn on whether the broader rights are necessary to
protect the investments that have been made in inventing, and that will be
made in developing, the patentee's particular laser. If the patent has that scope,
then broadening the patent further is unnecessary.
!d.
37 4. In contrast, the specification methodology's claim scope paradigm does not implement
the cumulative innovation patent theory. The cumulative innovation theory, as Merges and
Nelson formulated, tailors patent scope to provide adequate incentives to initial inventors,
while not deterring subsequent improvers. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 1, at 876-79; see
also Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1607-08 (using the phrase "cumulative innovation"). The
specification methodology employs no such tailoring, ignoring whether an invention is a
pioneer, an initial invention in a field, or an improvement. Additionally, when interpreting
a claim, the specification methodology does not inquire about what effect the resulting claim
scope will have on follow-up inventions.
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come close to implementing the competitive innovation theory. Its
claim scope paradigm would score well under this patent theory.

2. Prospect Theory (Possibly) Supports the Selection of the
Heavy Presumption Methodology
In contrast, the heavy presumption methodology does not
necessarily score well under any particular patent theory. The
methodology's claim scope paradigm produces a patent scope that
is connected only loosely to the specification's teachings. The heavy
presumption methodology focuses almost entirely on simply giving
the patent claims their ordinarily understood meanings. The
methodology's claim scope paradigm shows little concern for
whether the resulting patent scope relates to the patentee's
inventive activities. 375 The paradigm's inability to produce a definite
relationship between the patent's scope and the described invention
hampers any association the methodology can have with a specific
patent theory.
The extent of the heavy presumption methodology's ability to
implement the prospect theory of patents provides a good example.
The methodology arguably implements the prospect theory. By not
limiting the patent scope to the specification's specific embodiments,376 the methodology potentially creates a range of exclusivity
far greater than the patentee's specific implementation of the
invention. The methodology may give the patentee the greatest
375. See Phillips v. AWH Corp. (Phillips Ill), Nos. 03-1269,03-1286,2005 WL 1620331, at
*14 (Fed. Cir. July 12, 2005) (en bane) (noting how the heavy presumption methodology
results in interpretations that are abstract from, and out of context with, the disclosed
invention); Rousey Pharm. v. Astrazeneca UK Ltd., 366 F.3d 1348, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(Newman, J., dissenting) (stating that the heavy "presumption dissociates the term from the
invention described, enabled, and prosecuted by the inventor, and places an unnecessary
burden on the inventor who wants simply to restore the meaning that the inventor and the
examiner, and others in the field of the invention, clearly understand"); SuperGuide Corp. v.
DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 898 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Michel, J., concurring) (indicating
that the current trend emphasizing ordinary meaning "compromises two fundamental tenets
of the patent system: first, that the applicant must be the 'inventor' of the things covered by
the patent claims, and second, that the right to exclude will be no broader than the inventor's
enabling disclosure").
376. See Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see
also Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 906 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("[T]his court has
expressly rejected the contention that if a patent describes only a single embodiment, the
claims of the patent must be construed as being limited to that embodiment.").
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possible breadth of patent protection because dictionary definitions
provide the methodology's only substantive limitation on patent
scope. 377 Mfording a patent broad protection well beyond the
patente_e's specific embodiments may give the patent holder the
necessary protection to successfully commercialize and improve
upon the invention, and thus it may further the pros-pect theory.
The prospect theory that Kitch developed contends that a patent
functions as a "prospect," encouraging the invention's further
development and commercialization. 378 Patent protection is viewed
as providing ex post incentives to prompt the patented invention's
efficient maturity. 379 By giving the patentee exclusive control over
her prospect, the patentee ''has an incentive to make investments to
maximize the patent's value without fear that the fruits of the
investment will produce unpatentable information that competitors
can appropriate." 380 Under this theory, patent law provides the
patentee ''breathing room" to develop, market, and improve upon
the invention without interference from others. 381 In addition,
patent protection allows the patentee to coordinate any development
or improvement through licensing. 382 The prospect theory argues
that "technological information is a resource which will not be used
efficiently absent exclusive ownership," and patent law provides this
exclusive ownership. 383
The prospect theory, therefore, implies necessarily that patent
law should provide an inventor with a broad patent scope. The
patent must not only provide exclusivity over the invention, but also
exclusivity over the complete prospect surrounding the invention. 384
Patent law must give the patentee broad patent protection covering
377. See Phillips Ill, 2005 WL 1620331, at *14-15 (concluding that the heavy presumption
methodology will "systematically cause the construction of the claim to be unduly expansive");
SuperGuide, 358 F.3d at 898 (Michel, J., concurring) (indicating that "[t]he ultimate result of
this trend is claim constructions providing the broadest possible scope to claim terms, absent
express limiting language in the claim, specification or prosecution history, but regardless of
what the inventors actually invented").
378. See Kitch, supra note 6, at 265, 276, 285-86; see also Duffy, supra note 373, at 440-42.
379. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1601 (noting that prospect theory views the
patent system as providing no incentive to invent, but rather "giving exclusive rights to
successful inventors in order to encourage future invention"); Lemley, supra note 5, at 132-33.
380. Kitch, supra note 6, at 276.
381. See id. at 276-77; see also Merges & Nelson, supra note 1, at 871.
382. See Kitch, supra note 6, at 279; see a.Zso Merges & Nelson, supra note 1, at 871.
383. Kitch, supra note 6, at 276; see also Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1601-03.
384. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1603-04.
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the "matrix of technological possibilities" regarding the invention,
including its commercial embodiments and potential improvements.385 This broad protection creates the ex post incentive to
develop the invention because it makes the patentee the sole
controller of the invention's development or improvement. 386
The heavy presumption methodology, although having the potential to create broad protection, does not stay true to the prospect
theory. In most cases, its claim scope paradigm does not tune the
resulting patent scope to any other aspect of the patent, the
invention, or the technology underlying the patent. 387 A claim's
definition under this methodology is not linked necessarily to the
patentee's inventive activities, and the prospect theory is focused on
such activities. 388 Thus, this claim scope paradigm cannot ensure
that the patentee will have the protection necessary to facilitate
coordination of the invention's development and improvement. The
heavy presumption methodology can create a claim scope that fails
to protect aspects of the invention altogether. 389
This potential for the defined claim scope to be dissociated from
the patentee's invention frustrates the heavy presumption methodology's ability to implement any particular patent theory. Almost all
patent theories are centered, in some way, around the patentee's
actual inventive activities. The competitive innovation theory
suggests patent protection that is tailored closely to the patentee's
inventive activities. 390 The prospect theory, in contrast, supports
patent scope that provides broad protection for what the patentee
has actually developed. 391 Other theories, such as the cumulative
innovation theory, are also tuned to the patentee's invention. 392

385. See Kitch, supra note 6, at 271. "A prospect theory therefore suggests that patents
should be granted early in the invention process, and should have broad scope and few
exceptions." Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1604.
386. See Kitch, supra note 6, at 275-79.
387. See Figure 4, supra p. 115.
388. See Phillips v. AWH Corp. (Phillips Ill), Nos. 03-1269,03-1286, 2005 WL 1620331, at
*14-17 (Fed. Cir. July 12, 2005) (en bane) (concluding that under this methodology, the
resulting construction is "abstract" and "out of [the) particular context" of the patentee's
disclosed invention); Kitch, supra note 6, at 276-77.
389. See, e.g., K-2 Corp. v. Salomon SA., 191 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
390. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1607.
391. See Kitch, supra note 6, at 275-79.
392. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1607-10; Merges & Nelson, supra note 1, at 87679.

124

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:49

Thus, only an evaluator who subscribed to the prospect theory
would possibly favor the heavy presumption methodology. The
methodology's claim scope paradigm can result in a broad claim
scope, falling in line with the prospect theory, though the claim
scope paradigm's inability to fix patent scope to the patentee's
invention in some manner prevents it from successfully implementing the prospect theory.

C. Benefits to Using Claim Scope Paradigm as a Criterion
The benefits to using claim scope paradigm as a criterion are
twofold. First, using this criterion ensures that the effect that a
methodology has on the patent claim's substantive function is taken
into account. Interpretation methodologies, as demonstrated, clearly
impact the extent of patent protection. By using a claim scope
paradigm in the methodology evaluation process, this impact can be
recognized and methodologies can be evaluated as to whether they
produce a favorable claim scope. Second, identifying the claim scope
paradigm allows methodologies to become highly effective patent
policy levers. The discretion and direct effect that a methodology has
on a patent scope makes it a perfect tool for adjusting and interjecting policy and theory into the patent system.

1. Claim Scope Paradigm Addresses a Methodology's Effect on
the Substantive Function of Patent Claims
The main benefit to using claim scope paradigm as an evaluation
criterion is that it addresses a methodology's effect on the main
function of patent claims-substantively defining patent scope. A
methodology's claim scope paradigm discloses the impact that the
methodology will have on the specifics of claim scope. This result
has been demonstrated already for the two recent interpretation
methodologies. By identifying its claim scope paradigm, one can now
see that the specification methodology produces a claim scope that
is tailored to the fully disclosed invention. The claim scope paradigm
in the heavy presumption methodology shows that the methodology
will result in a claim scope that is tied only loosely to the patentee's
invention. By identifying each methodology's claim scope paradigm,
one can tell how that methodology will impact the scope of patent
protection that the defined claim will give.
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The full impact of a claim interpretation methodology on the
patent claim's substantive function can then be properly assessed.
Claims are interpreted to answer fundamental patent questions,
such as which product or processes the patent holder may exclude
and whether the patent's scope of exclusivity is valid and, therefore,
protectable. Because a claim scope paradigm exists, the methodology chosen has a direct impact on the answers to these questions.
By recognizing a methodology's claim scope paradigm, courts can
confront a methodology's role in shaping the substantive function of
patent claims. Courts can then evaluate methodologies based on
how the methodologies influence the basic patent issues of infringement and validity. Methodologies can be chosen that produce a
desired claim scope or, at the least, do not frustrate patent policy.
The claim scope paradigm criterion recognizes the normative
features of claim interpretation methodologies. The criterion speaks
to the substantive aspect of patent claims, an aspect that the
certainty criterion fails to address. That being said, using the claim
scope paradigm as a benchmark does not mean that the certainty
criterion must be discarded. The two criteria can be used in
tandem. 393 In no way does the introduction of the claim scope
paradigm criterion mean that methodologies should never be
examined as to their predictability. A claim interpretation methodology can be evaluated under both criteria, and methodologies can
be considered as to how well they score under each standard. Use of
both criteria in the evaluation process is depicted graphically in
Figure 5 below.

393. One commentator has collectively used multiple criteria to judge interpretation
methodologies. See Nard, supra note 57, at 35·43, 65-82 (using certainty, institutional
competence, and a methodology's effect on ex post innovation as criteria to evaluate a
methodology identified as ''hypertextualism").
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Figure 5
The more certainty that a methodology produces in defining
claims, the better it scores under that criterion and the further up
the vertical axis it moves in Figure 5. Methodologies that create
some certainty-"positiv~" certainty-as to the resulting definition
are plotted in the positive regions on the vertical axis in either
quadrant I or II. A similar analysis is performed for the methodology's claim scope paradigm. The greater the success that the
methodology's claim scope paradigm has in implementing what is
considered the proper claim scope, the better the methodology scores
under the claim scope paradigm standard. The result of this
evaluation is graphed relative to the horizontal axis in Figure 5.
Again, as with the certainty criterion, a methodology's claim scope
paradigm may frustrate the preferred patent scope's implementation, and thus score poorly. 394 Methodologies in which the claim
394. A good example of this situation would be the evaluation of the heavy presumption
methodology's ability to implement the competitive innovation patent theory. The heavy
presumption methodology's claim scope paradigm does not tailor claim scope to the disclosed
invention. In fact, it does the opposite. See supra Part IV.B.2. Such a methodology would score
poorly in an evaluation in which the preferred claim scope is limited to the patentee's actual
inventive activities.
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scope paradigm is favored will fall in the positive part of the
horizontal axis in either quadrant II or IV.
Methodologies, therefore, become more favorable as they move
into the upper right hand quadrant or quadrant II. Methodologies
falling in quadrant II both increase certainty and have a claim scope
paradigm that is at least somewhat successful in implementing the
preferred patent scope.
Use of both criteria can be quite successful and can ensure that
a methodology maximizes both functions of patent claims-public
notice and the substantive defining of claim scope. Moreover,
nothing indicates that maximization of one benchmark is mutually
exclusive of the other. The opposite may even be true; a positive
relationship could exist between the two criteria. As a methodology
comes closer to producing what is considered the proper claim scope,
that methodology may necessarily produce a more predictable
definition. At the least, taking both criteria into account ensures
that both functions of the patent claim are being considered when
adopting a method for interpreting them.

2. Recognizing that the Claim Scope Paradigm Facilitates
Using Claim Interpretation Methodology as a Highly Effective
Patent Policy Lever
The identification of a methodology's claim scope paradigm also
facilitates the methodology's use as a patent policy lever. As Burk
and Lemley recognized recently, the patent system gives courts considerable discretion in implementing patent law. 395 This discretion,
in turn, allows courts to embed policy considerations in their patent
decisions. 396 Burk and Lemley use the term "policy levers" to
describe these areas of discretion that affect patent policy. 397 They
focus their patent policy lever discussion on using court discretion
to create "industry-sensitive policy." 398 Certain policy levers that
they identify, such as the utility and written description require395. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1630, 1638-40.
396. Id.
397. See id. at 1630 (using the "policy lever'' terminology); see also Pamela Samuelson &
Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575,
1581 (2002) (discussing policy levers in the reverse engineering context, but with regard to
specific industries and intellectual property generally).
398. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1630.
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ments, allow courts to shape patent law to have different impacts on
different industries. 399 One potential policy lever Burk and Lemley
do not discuss is claim interpretation methodology.
Claim interpretation methodology possesses all of the attributes
of a patent policy lever. Courts are given a wide range of discretion
in formulating claim interpretation methodologies. Moreover, in
using this discretion, courts have embedded claim scope paradigms
into their methodologies. 400 These paradigms directly affect the
extent of patent protection. 401 By using its discretion, a court can use
interpretation methodology as a ''lever" to implement specific patent
policies by directly impacting claim scope. The available discretion,
combined with the ability to affect patent scope, makes claim
interpretation methodology eligible as a policy lever.
Interpretation methodology is a highly effective policy lever. A
methodology's claim scope paradigm imputes patent theory into the
definitional process, as the defined claim's scope reflects the claim
scope paradigm. Injecting patent policy at the analysis's interpretation stage introduces such policy at the patent process's most basic
level. Claim interpretation is the first step in determining infringement and validity, the two major patent inquiries. 402 Any policy
introduced at the interpretation stage propagates throughout the
patent analysis. The construed claim is used to determine which
competitors a patentee can exclude or whether the patent is valid
and enforceable against those competitors. 403 The claim scope
paradigm's view on proper claim scope shapes the complete patent
analysis because claims are at the base of the analysis. If the policy
lever needs to be moved, the interpretation methodology that is used
can be changed simply. That change of claim scope paradigm at the
interpretation level will then ripple throughout the patent process.
Claim interpretation methodology can be contrasted with the
policy levers currently under discussion. These levers mainly
include various tests for determining the validity of the patent
grant. 404 They address, for example, whether the patented invention
399. ld. at 1641-58 (detailing other existing policy levers).
400. See supra Part IV.A.
401. See supra Part IV.B.
402. See supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
403. See id.
404. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1641-68. The policy levers that Burk and Lemley
discuss as either currently in use or of potential use also include levers not related to validity
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is obvious in light of the prior art or whether the patented invention
is enabled sufficiently. 405 The reason interpretation methodology is
a better lever than these validity tests is timing; both of these
known levers are triggered after the patent claims are interpreted.406 The claim scope paradigm has appeared already in the
defined claim when these known levers are activated. Patent policy
is set already, by the interpretation methodology chosen, before
these recognized policy levers can take effect. Interpretation
methodology also impacts infringement, the other major part of
most patent questions. 407 Few, if any, currently recognized patent
policy levers address this part of the patent system. 408 Without
recognizing claim interpretation as a policy lever, a base level policy
tool will not be fully utilized and the potential frustration that it can
cause other policy levers will go unnoticed.
Two concerns exist with using claim interpretation methodology
as a policy lever. The first focuses on the propriety of courts setting
patent policy, particularly at such a low level, without any clear
direction from Congress. If courts look to and compare claim scope
paradigms, they are making substantive judgments about what is
considered optimal patent protection. Such substantive decisions
arguably should be made only by policymakers, who have access to
complete information on the industry effects of patents, and not by
courts, which only have information about the particular case
before them. This objection to courts employing policy levers may be
especially valid when dealing with claim interpretation. The court
should focus solely on giving the claim language meaning at the
claim construction stage, not making patent policy. If the courts
engage in any policy analysis, it should come later in the patent
process, where statutes constrain the extent to which courtemployed policy levers can swing.
The fallacy with this concern is that courts are already making
substantive judgments when choosing claim interpretation methodquestions. However, the majority of the levers are tied in some way to the patentability of the
subject matter at issue. Id.
405. Id. at 1651-54.
406. See supra notes 71-79, 95-100.
407. See supra notes 64-70, 100.
408. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1641-68. For example, the policy levers of
experimental use, id. at 1646-48, and reverse doctrine of equivalents, id. at 1657-58, are some
of the few that concern questions of patent infringement.
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ologies, regardless of propriety. No statutes exist that dictate how
claims are interpreted, and claim interpretation methodologies
include claim scope paradigms that embed patent theory in the
resulting claim definitions. When courts are faced with choices
between methodologies, they are also facing patent policy choices. 409
For example, compare the majority and dissent in Microsoft. Both
choose different methodologies, but they made this choice in the real
context of whether Multi-Tech's patents will give them protection
over voice and data transmissions on both telephone connections
and the Internet. 410 The methodology choice in Microsoft was
intertwined with the question of how broad of a transmission
system Multi-Tech should own exclusively. The same situation
existed in SuperGuide, where a decision on proper methodology was
tied to a decision on the proper claim scope, namely, whether to
include digital television signals or not in the patentee's scope of
protection. 411 Again, a methodology question and a question of a
patent's im_ract on the satellite television industry become one and
the same. The mere existence of a claim scope paradigm means that
all decisions regarding methodologies are also decisions regarding
patent policy.
Courts will thus make policy decisions when they construe claims
regardless of whether they openly recognize this fact and use
methodology as a lever. One benefit of establishing claim scope
paradigm as a criterion is that these policy decisions become
transparent. 412 Courts and observers will at least know the policy
implications of selecting one methodology over the other. Furthermore, with the inevitability of patent policy becoming tied to
interpretation methodology, courts might as well use methodology
as a policy lever. If a certain methodology is producing a claim scope
that the courts disfavor, the courts, can at minimum, switch to a
methodology with a more favorable claim scope paradigm.

a

409. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1674 (noting how "[t]he Federal Circuit cannot
avoid making policy judgments" when it uses its discretion).
410. See Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-Tech Sys., Inc. 357 F.3d 1340, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2004); id.
at 1354-55 (Rader, J., dissenting).
411. See SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d 872,877-79 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
412. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1673-75 (noting that by making these policy
decisions transparent, courts are more likely to face the policy implications of their decisions
and ensure that they are congruent with innovation policy); see also John R. Thomas,
Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771, 774 (2003).
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The concern about methodology as a policy lever also underplays
the ability of courts to make competent patent policy decisions. This
is particularly apparent in the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit
has an inherent expertise in the patent arena, considering that it
exclusively handles all patent appeals. 413 The court has a real institutional competence when it comes to patent law and policy, 414
which primarily stems from its interaction with nearly every patent
case filed in the United States. 415 The scientific and patent law
background of some of the judges on the court also gives the court
a significant degree of proficiency in the patent area. 416 No reason
exists for the court not to use its knowledge and experience when
selecting among methodologies and their claim scope paradigms. If
such activity truly falls outside of the court's providence, Congress
can always act and legislate a specific methodology that courts must
use.417
Another objection to using claim interpretation methodology as
a policy lever is that such use will fuel game-playing problems by
those drafting and obtaining patents. 418 Patent prosecutors, who
help individuals obtain patents, react to patent rules to maximize
the protection they obtain for their clients. A feedback of sorts
exists, wherein a patent rule is established and patent prosecutors
react to the rule. 419 Adopting a particular claim methodology will
likely have ex ante effects. 420 Patent prosecutors will change the
way that patent claims and specifications are drafted in order to

413. See Cotropia, supra note 245, at 259-61; Dreyfuss, supra note 250, at 14-25 (assessing
the effectiveness of the Federal Circuit in accomplishing the goals it was designed to achieve).
414. See Dreyfuss, supra note 250, at 17-21.
415. Id.
416. See Rai, supra note 3, at 1068 (noting, however, that even this expertise is insufficient
to give the court competence in factual issues).
417. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1630-31 (noting how Congress has tailored patent
legislation to particular industries).
418. See Boalick, supra note 14 7, at 270-71 (noting the interaction between the dedication
rule and patent drafting); R. Polk Wagner, Reconsidering EstoppeL· Patent Administration and
the Failure o[Festo, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 159, 242-43 (2002) (discussing the ex ante effects of
prosecution history estoppel).
419. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyu Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 739 (2002);
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 41 (1997) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) (noting concern with how changes in patent rules affect the expectations of
patentees during prosecution).
420. See Boalick, supra note 147, at 270-71; Wagner, supra note 418, at 242-43.
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maximize patent scope under the new claim construction rules. 421
Such a feedback potentially could neutralize a claim interpretation
methodology's ability to act as a policy lever. For example, the
specification methodology is chosen because it implements the
competitive innovation theory, thereby limiting claim scope to the
disclosed invention. Patent practitioners will likely react to this
methodology's adoption by redrafting patent claims and the
specification to maximize the resulting patent scope. Because of this
feedback, patent scope could be larger than intended, thereby
inhibiting the implementation of the competitive innovation theory
because of the adjustments practitioners may make.
The ability of this feedback loop to frustrate the interpretation
methodology's ability to act as a policy lever is overstated. Real
world limitations exist on the changes that patent prosecutors can
make to the patent document. The disclosure rules in 35 U.S.C.
§ 112 dictate the specifications' contents. Every patentee must
set forth a written description of each's invention that is also
enabling. 422 In addition, the patentee must be the inventor of the
claimed subject matter. 423 The patent prosecutor is therefore
constrained to some extent by the patentee's inventive activities.
Also, not all reactions frustrate the policies that courts are trying to
further. For example, consider the specific feedback described above.
If the specification methodology's adoption causes patent prosecutors to include more information in the specification in hopes of
expanding what constitutes the disclosed invention, that reaction
will not frustrate the competitive innovation theory. The resulting
claim scope will still be tailored to the disclosed invention. The
resulting scope of protection will still only give the patentee
protection for her invention and the variations recognized by one
skilled in the art. Finally, an equilibrium is reachable once a single
methodology and claim scope paradigm is chosen. Practitioners only
react when rules are changed or are unclear. Courts may change
their rules in reaction to the changes practitioners make, but, in
each feedback step, the amount of change from the previous state

421. Wagner, supra note 418, at 242-43.
422. See supra Part II.B.l.
423. See 35 U.S.C. § 115, § 102(f) (2000); Pannu v. lolab Corp., 155 F.3d 1344, 1348-49 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (noting that a patent is invalid if the named inventor did not invent the claimed
invention).

2005]

PATENT CLAIM INTERPRETATION METHODOLOGIES

133

will be smaller and the action-reaction cycle will eventually come to
rest.
CONCLUSION

Claim interpretation involves more than simply trying to
determine the meaning of claim terms. Claim interpretation
includes choices among available patent scopes. These choices are
made by selecting a particular claim interpretation methodology.
The way claims are defined directly affects the resulting literal
claim scope, and thus, the extent of the power that the patentee can
exert on a given industry. This effect on claim scope is a methodology's claim scope paradigm. The current debate regarding claim
interpretation fails to fully recognize the relationship between claim
interpretation methodology and patent scope. The recent Phillips III
decision is a step in the right direction, showing some appreciation
by the Federal Circuit for the relationship between methodology and
claim scope. However, the court and commentators still fail to gain
the full benefit from identifying a methodology's claim scope
paradigm and then recognizing the impact the methodology has on
patent policy. Such recognition will facilitate courts to use methodologies as a highly effective patent policy lever.

